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ABSTRACT
Health information exchange (HIE) - the electronic exchange of health
information among healthcare institutions - has been projected to hold
enormous promise as an antidote to the fragmented healthcare delivery system
in the United States. After decades of mostly failed attempts, we still do not
know how to make HIE work. This thesis is the beginning of a systematic
understanding of HIE, focusing on the clinical users and the context in which the
users and the technology interact. It uses a systems approach to understand HIE
from the perspectives of the core stakeholders including healthcare providers,
patients, health IT vendor companies, public policy, and the HIE organizations
that supply data exchange services. The core contributions of the thesis are
contained in four studies.
Values of healthcare providers as stakeholders in HIE In a stud y of three
communities, healthcare provider organizations were found to expect regional
HIE organizations to bring them benefits from the ability to measure care quality.
However, one relatively larger community placed greater value on the strategic
interests of its individual provider institutions, whereas two smaller communities
valued the interests of the communities as a whole.
Factors that affect clinicians' usage of HIE. In a study of clinician-users of
an operational HIE, usage factors were categorized as motivators and
moderators. Motivators for individual clinicians' usage of HIE included improving
care quality and time savings. Moderators were numerous and included gaps in
data, workflow complexity and usability issues. Several policy options and
implications are discussed including: requiring HIE organizations to report
metrics of HIE contributions and accesses; certifying HIE vendor companies to
provide standardized usage metrics; and creating incentives for clinicians as well
as HIE organizations and regional health IT extension centers to meet HIE usage
targets.
Analysis of opportunities to use HIE. In one community, 51% of visits
involved "care transitions" among individual providers, and 36-41% involved care
transitions between medical groups. The percentage of a provider's visits which
involved care transitions varied considerably by clinical specialty and even within
specialties. Within primary care, individual clinicians' "transition percentages"
varied from 32% to 95%. This study discusses how policies designed to foster
HIE usage should take this variation into account.
Analysis of mergers and provider recruitment on HIE value. In a
simulation study of patient visit patterns in 10 communities, the results suggest
that even after substantial consolidation of medical groups, an HIE would still
have considerable value as measured by the number of opportunities for data
exchange. However, in each community a small number of medical groups were
key: if absent from a community HIE, these groups would reduce the value by
50%. Conversely, if they were the only groups participating, the HIE's value
would only achieve 10-20% of its value with all groups participating.
The results of these studies suggest that HIE will be needed even in the
event of the expected large-scale consolidation of healthcare providers. However,
efforts will be needed to recruit medical groups to join HIE organizations, to
improve HIE technology, and to train clinicians to integrate HIE into their
workflows.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 The landscape of health information exchange (HIE)
1.1.1 The need for HIE
In the United States, 125 million people live with chronic medical
conditions. [1] Most of them receive care from multiple healthcare providers.
Between 2000 and 2002, the typical Medicare beneficiary saw a median of seven
different physicians, in four different offices, each year, and those with chronic
conditions saw up to 16 physicians per year. [2] Within individual episodes of
care for many common clinical conditions, multiple physicians are often involved.
For example, a median of 8 physicians were involved in episodes of acute
myocardial infarction for Medicare patients. [3] For patients such as these who
are treated by multiple care-givers, coordination of care among providers is a
necessity. Without care coordination, patients may receive inappropriate or
harmful treatments and incur unnecessary costs of redundant diagnostic testing.
[4] [5]
Unfortunately, failures in care coordination are common. [6] Primary care
clinicians have reported that in more than 13% of patient visits there is missing
clinical information. [7] A study of referrals found that 28% of primary care
physicians and 49% of specialists were dissatisfied with the quality of
information they received from each other. [4] A study of emergency room
patients found that information about medical history and laboratory results were
absent in almost 33% of adult visits. [8] Another group of investigators asked
physicians if information from specific previous visits was available at the time of
a visit and they found that information was available for only 22% of previous
visits. [9]
For decades, healthcare researchers have recognized that coordination of
care could be improved and wasteful costs could be reduced or eliminated
through the use of information technology. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] In
several reports, the Institute of Medicine has recommended that the electronic
health records (EHR) of physicians should be connected together so that clinical
data is shared electronically across clinical settings. This provider-provider data
exchange is a significant component of what is known today as health
information exchange (HIE).* [11] [12] [16] HIE has been defined as "the
sharing of clinical and administrative data across the boundaries of health care
institutions, health data repositories, and States." [16] One study estimated the
national cost savings for HIE at $77.8 billion per year, of which $13.2 billion
comes from provider-provider data exchange. [14] [17]
Researchers have suggested ways to implement HIE, and a raft of HIE-
related organizations and products have been launched. Most of the
organizations are community-based attempts to integrate information sources
from several independent provider organizations or other regional data sources
such as laboratories and pharmacies.[18] [19] Researchers have described
architectural strategies for these organizations along a continuum of varying
degrees of integration, ranging from a completely centralized system to a
federated design in which each medical practice retains control of the data it
generates. [20] Other potential methods for HIE include interoperable personal
health records (PHR) which would allow patients to collect and control access to
their medical information. [21] [22] [23] [24] Several products have been
created which aspire to serve as interoperable PHRs. [25] [26] [27]
1.1.2 The current state of HIE
Despite considerable promise, decades of research, and hundreds of pilot
projects, HIE has had many failures and it is unclear if any are unalloyed
successes.[28] [29] [30] [31] Of more than one hundred HIE organizations in
the United States today, few have demonstrated financial sustainability and even
fewer have capabilities to exchange a wide range of data and include a large
population of patients. [19] Many are no longer in existence. [31] Efforts to
create similar organizations in the 1990s, known as Community Health
Information Networks (CHINs), have largely failed.[29] Current products aspiring
to be interoperable PHRs have integrated with only a few provider organizations'
EHRs and data on their adoption and usage are sparse.
Researchers have tried to understand the reasons for the slow pace of
HIE diffusion. Many believe issues with technical standards inhibit HIE. [32] [33]
[34] Another reason may be that only 13 percent of U.S. ambulatory physicians
* This thesis uses the term HIE as a verb (the activity of exchange health information) and a noun (the
organizations that facilitate exchanging health information).
use an EHR, without which participation in an HIE is possible only on a limited
basis. [35] Small practices are even less likely to have EHRs and, because most
providers in the U.S. work in small practices, their participation is important for
HIE to succeed on a large scale. [36] Even small practices that do use EHRs have
likely not joined or even plan to join HIEs, according to one study. [37]
Other reasons may include perverse incentives and market failures in the
healthcare sector, most notably the fee-for-service payment system which does
not pay providers for coordinating their patients' care or offset the considerable
financial and workflow costs of installing an EHR. [34] Alternative payment
systems, however, are problematic without rigorous measurements of healthcare
quality. Unfortunately, established measures of healthcare quality address only a
relatively small part of all healthcare services and experts believe that, for
example, the 26 existing measures of quality developed by the Ambulatory care
Quality Alliance (AQA) "may only be impacted modestly by HIE, and the major
effects of HIE may fall outside of the AQA measures." [38] One study points out
that "no single metric set exists for measuring the effects of EHRs and health
information exchange on quality of care." [39] Established quality measures are
also limited because they largely rely on administrative data, which lack
important clinical information, and medical charts reviews, which cannot be done
reliably and efficiently unless the medical data is maintained in standardized
electronic form. This situation had led researchers to postulate that health IT is
stuck in a chicken-and-egg dilemma: "[health] IT adoption is retarded by the
market failure of inability to measure quality. But, to measure quality better,
[health] IT must be adopted." [15]
Studies of nascent and defunct HIEs reveal additional barriers.
Competition among providers for patients may create disincentives for data
sharing. [29] [40] One study found that physicians and hospitals "feared losing
competitive advantage by relinquishing control of 'their' data." [41] Technical
issues, stakeholder politics, liability concerns regarding confidentiality, and moral
hazards created by excess grant funding are thought to have contributed to the
delays and demise of one prominent HIE.[31] The earlier CHIN movement is
thought to have failed because of poorly conceived objectives, conflicting
missions, lack of trust among stakeholders, lack of clear ownership over data
systems and information, unclear financing, and the conflicting technical needs
of a centralized data repository with privacy concerns.[42] While HIEs have
struggled to overcome these obstacles, other piecemeal forms of communication
between providers, such as hospital-physician portals, have proliferated, possibly
undermining providers' motivation to adopt the more comprehensive - but also
more expensive - information services offered by HIEs. [31] [43]
Regardless of the reasons for this slow uptake, it is clear that the current
state of HIE - and health IT in general - falls far short of its potential.
Fortunately, healthcare leaders have taken notice of this shortfall.
1.1.3 The policy response
Policymakers in both major U.S. political parties have recognized the
importance of expanding EHRs and HIE. In 2005 Newt Gingrich supported a bill
introduced by Hillary Clinton that promoted federal grants to regional efforts that
support HIE, reflecting clear bipartisan agreement. [44] When President Obama
assumed office, he continued support of the Office of the National Coordinator
for Health IT (ONC), an office within the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) that was created under former President George W. Bush in
2004. For its first few years ONC began harmonizing technical standards,
creating a framework for a national health information network, establishing
privacy and security policies, and certifying vendors' EHR products based on their
functional capabilities.
Then, in what is perhaps the most significant policy breakthrough in the
history of health IT, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of
2009 designated approximately $27 billion in incentive payments for clinicians to
adopt EHRs and HIE and additional funding to establish regional health IT
extension centers. [45] The incentive payments will be made to healthcare
providers who demonstrate "meaningful use" of health information technologies.
The extension centers will support clinicians as they adopt the health IT systems
to qualify for the meaningful use payments. The legislation specifies that the
criteria used to measure meaningful use are decided by a federal policy
committee. The payments will be made in three stages in years 2011 (stage 1),
2013 (stage 2) and 2015 (stage 3) and the criteria will expand with each stage.
ARRA specifies that physicians who still do not meet the meaningful-use criteria
after the payment period expires will find their Medicare reimbursements begin
to decline, adding teeth to the incentives.
Policymakers have recently finalized the stage 1 criteria [46] [47] The
proposed goals of stage 1 include "electronically capturing health information in
a coded format; using that information to track key clinical conditions and
communicating that information for care coordination purposes (whether that
information is structured or unstructured, but in structured format whenever
feasible)." [48] Specific measures for stage 1 require eligible providers to
"perform at least one test of their EHRs capacity to electronically exchange
information." Several other stage 1 measures, such as those requiring that a
"summary of care record is provided for more than 50% of patient transitions or
referrals" and "more than 10% of patients are provided electronic access to
information within 4 days of its being updated in the EHR," may also nurture the
growth of HIEs or interoperable PHRs. Policymakers have also issued guidelines
for stages 2 and 3 which indicate stronger HIE requirements. Stage 2 will require
"the exchange of information in the most structured format possible" and stage 3
will focus on "access to comprehensive patient data."
As part of the meaningful use criteria, policymakers are considering
requiring the use of standard protocols that allow secure point-to-point
communication between clinicians. ONC is sponsoring the development of these
protocols in a project called the Nationwide Health Information Network Direct
(recently renamed the "Direct Project"). [49] [50] These protocols, however,
would provide only a limited form of HIE and, if included, would likely be only
one component of the HIE-related meaningful use criteria. More advanced forms
of HIE, that involve creating aggregate patients records - longitudinal records of
patients' health information aggregated from multiple clinical sources - will
probably be required also.
The ARRA meaningful use payments are different from previous attempts
to promote health IT. While other projects have funded health IT for providers in
specific locations, ARRA's direct incentives apply to most providers in the country,
dwarfing the scope of even the largest previous initiatives which were mostly at
the state or regional level. [19] [51] Also, whereas prior projects issued grants to
providers for the purchase of health IT systems or expected the providers to pay
the bulk of the costs themselves, ARRA has introduced the concept of
"meaningful use" of these systems as a condition for receiving payment. These
aspects of the ARRA payments may help to motivate enough providers to adopt
EHRs and HIE so that the chicken-and-egg dilemma and other barriers to health
IT adoption are finally overcome.
In March of 2010, the landscape for HIE was altered once again with the
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). While much
of this legislation does not directly bear upon HIE, some of the reform programs
it will initiate may result in fundamental changes to the incentive environment of
healthcare providers, which may increase their motivation to adopt and use HIE.
Conversely, HIE may enable some of these reforms to succeed, by allowing more
efficient information gathering and improvements in healthcare quality
measurement. (See chapter 6.) These large-scale policy movements may finally
make HIE a reality after decades of stalled progress. However, important
decisions regarding the criteria for receiving meaningful use payments and the
scope and responsibilities of HIE organizations have not yet been made,
decisions which will likely prove pivotal to HIE success.
1.2 Evaluating HIE
Even before ARRA was enacted, researchers had taken a strong interest in
evaluating HIE projects. [38] Rigorous evaluation of HIE is important because it
enables HIE organizations to demonstrate value to their stakeholders and allows
policymakers and researchers to compare projects and generalize across regions.
[52] With the enactment of ARRA, HIE evaluation takes on even more
importance by potentially informing stages 2 and 3 of the meaningful use criteria
and other public policies that might shape the priorities of HIE organizations and
the new health IT extension centers. With the enactment of Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010, HIE evaluations may also have implications for
the new projects called for in that legislation which will likely depend on HIE,
such as accountable care organizations and patient-centered medical homes. [53]
[54]
One metric that can be used for evaluating an HIE is the degree to which
its business model is sustainable and does not rely upon external grants or
donations. [55] The rationale behind this metric is that if stakeholders are willing
to pay for an HIE's services, those services must be creating value for the
stakeholders. This would only be true if the HIE services are not bundled with
other non-HIE services and if the providers were paying the fees voluntarily, not
because of a regulatory or external incentive requirement. Surveys show that
almost all HIEs relied on grants initially, and most still do, but a few have
achieved sustainability. [18] [19] A survey of physicians in Massachusetts found
that while most expected that HIE would reduce costs, improve quality, and save
them time, only 54% said they would pay an unspecified monthly fee for the
service and only 37% were willing to pay $150 per month for HIE, which may be
the approximate fee that HIEs will charge. [56] Because relatively few of these
physicians had experience using an HIE, many may change their attitudes once
HIE becomes available in their communities. Therefore, it is not clear if most
HIEs will ever be able to achieve financial sustainability and other measures of
value will likely be needed.
Even if most HIEs could reach sustainability, a sustainable business model
is not a sufficient condition for considering an HIE as a success. Many of the
HIEs that are financially sustainability are based on the delivery of laboratory
results rather than the provider-provider data exchanges that will help improve
care coordination but also require higher costs to design, install, and operate.[19]
Therefore, further evaluation will be needed even for HIEs that are financially
sustainable.
Some researchers have argued that a sustainable business model is not
even necessary for HIE success, and that HIEs should operate as public utilities.
[28] [57] Anticipated secondary benefits from HIE, such as disease surveillance
and quality reporting, support this argument. [58] However, a public utility
model may run the risk of the HIE users having no "skin in the game." If the
clinician-users are not voluntarily paying for unbundled HIE services, further
evaluation becomes even more important to demonstrate value. This point is
important for policymakers to consider when deciding the remaining criteria for
the meaningful use payments. Setting the criteria so that providers are merely
required to join an HIE and pay the fee will not be enough to ensure that HIEs
create value.
One way to improve the prospects for HIEs to create value and achieve
sustainability is by better understanding the "needs, expectations and
motivations of the many different stakeholders." [59] This kind of understanding
may allow HIEs and policymakers to take into account stakeholder values that
had not been previously understood. However, few such investigations have
been done. Experts have suggested using qualitative methods for these kinds of
evaluations so that important contextual factors are considered.
An important part of HIE evaluation is demonstrating its clinical and
financial benefits. Several studies have attempted this kind of evaluation, but few
have succeeded in demonstrating the magnitude of benefits that researchers
expect HIE to provide. [38] [52] One pilot randomized controlled trial of data
sharing in regional emergency departments (ED) found a savings of $26 per
encounter in one site, but the study did not find any savings in a second site and
could not prove that HIE had an effect on clinical quality measures. [60] The
implications of this study may be limited, however, because the data sharing was
done primarily through paper, electronic usage was found to be minimal, and the
clinical data originated from only one institution. Another study evaluating an
electronic link between EDs and family physicians did not find that the
intervention resulted in a reduction in resource utilization. [61] A third study
analyzed the HIE accesses of clinicians who treated a cohort of uninsured
patients and hypothesized that HIE usage would result in decreased volumes of
ED visits by those patients. That study failed to prove its hypothesis. [62]
Because the clinical and financial benefits of HIE have not yet been convincingly
demonstrated, models estimating HIE value have relied on expert opinion and
excluded significant sources of potential value. [14]
It is important for researchers to continue to search for ways to
demonstrate the benefits of HIE. However, several prominent experts have
suggested that not all evaluations need to be done on every project and "a
rigorous evaluation of the quality impact of an HIE intervention may only need to
be done three times if the results are consistent." [38] These experts point out
that studies of quality improvements and health outcomes are the most difficult
and require a large controlled trial. They suggest that after these studies have
been done, "confirmation that process variables are improving may serve as
sufficient evidence that the HIE project is clinically successful."
One such process variable is usage. [38] [55] A study of decision support
systems (not related to HIE) demonstrated that voluntary usage of information
technologies has been correlated with improvements in organizational
performance. [63] That study concludes that "the ability to capture and model
the actual usage of technology may be key in assessing the relationship between
implementing information technologies and benefits or payoffs results from
them." Measurements of HIE usage might therefore prove to be reasonable
approximations of an HIE's value, even absent rigorous evidence of clinical and
financial benefits.
A few studies have reported measurements related to HIE usage. A 2003
study of visits to ED in Indianapolis found that 7.6% of ED patients visit more
than one of the five hospital systems, and those patients account for 19% of the
total visits, which may be an estimate of the portion of potential data exchanges
between those EDs. [64] A 2004 study of electronic data interchange usage in
Beijing's hospitals reported usage values, but these data included non-clinical
document exchanges and therefore are difficult to interpret in terms of HIE. [65]
A 2008 symposium article about the MidSouth eHealth Alliance, an HIE in
Tennessee, looked at HIE use in five EDs and reported that the HIE was
accessed in approximately 3% of all visits and 10% of visits in which recent data
from another site was available. [66] A 2009 study of an HIE in Texas that was
limited to uninsured patients in specific clinics, and a subset of medical
information, reported that more than 56% of individuals had information
accessed in the HIE. [62] However, that study did not report counts of HIE
accesses or patient visits. A 2010 paper reviewed the academic literature on HIE
usage and related concepts for implications on the ARRA meaningful use
payments. [67] Another recent study, in December 2010, found that of adult
who visited acute care facilities in Massachusetts within a five year study period
31% of patients visited 2 or more hospitals during that period accounting for
56.5% of all acute care visits, and 1% of those patients visited 5 or more
hospitals.[68] None of these studies show how measurements of HIE usage can
be used in the design and operation of an HIE organization or to guide public
policy to promote or evaluate HIE projects.
1.3 Thesis goals and outline
This thesis provides a deeper understanding of HIE by evaluating
geographical communities in which HIEs have been planned and one in which an
HIE is operational. Using qualitative methods, it uncovers clinicians' values
related to HIE. Using quantitative methods, it shows how metrics related to HIE
usage can be used to create incentives for increasing HIE usage and can assess
the value and robustness of HIE projects. Policymakers and HIE organizations
can use the results of this research to help build and manage HIEs so that they
realize their potential to improve the quality and efficiency of healthcare.
In particular, this thesis asks four questions:
Question 1: What are the values of healthcare provider organizations as
stakeholders in HIE?
Question 2: What factors affect clinicians' usage of health information
exchange?
Question 3: What is the potential value of HIE as measured by "care
transitions?"
Question 4: How do mergers and variation of provider participation affect
an HIE's potential value?
The Chapter 2 addresses the first question by introducing several HIE
demonstration pilots and identifying some of the needs, expectations and
motivations of the participating healthcare providers related to HIE. We use
qualitative methods to discover these values by probing the reasons for the
providers' choice of technical architecture in their community HIEs. Our findings
suggest that providers' motivations and expectations for HIE may depend on the
size of the community and the organizational structure of its providers; larger
communities with many provider organizations may find more difficulty acting in
the strategic interest of the community as a whole when implementing HIE.
Chapter 3 addresses the second question by shifting focus from decisions
made by the communities as a whole to the values of individual clinician-users of
HIE for one of the pilot communities. We interview 22 clinicians and HIE staff
and identify factors that affect the clinicians' usage of the available HIE product.
We find several factors that motivate clinicians to use HIE and a long list of
factors that could moderate their usage. We then offer recommendations to
policymakers, HIE organizations and HIE vendor companies to account for these
factors. Many of our recommendations involve using measurements of HIE usage.
In chapter 4, we address the third question and propose a way to
estimate potential HIE usage based on patient care transitions and calculate
these measurements in one community that has an operational HIE. Our findings
suggest that potential usage varies considerably across different clinicians and
clinical specialties within this community and, therefore, this variation should be
taken into account when designing and evaluating HIEs.
Chapter 5 addressed the final question by applying the same
measurements of potential usage based on care transitions that we used in
chapter 4 to simulate how changes in an HIE's composition of healthcare
provider organizations may impact the potential usage of an HIE. We investigate
compositional variation in terms of scenarios of provider participation and
scenarios of provider consolidation. Using administrative claims data from 10
geographic communities, we simulate these scenarios using actual patient visits
patterns.
Developments in HIE are happening at the same time as other substantial
changes in the healthcare system. Chapter 6 analyzes which of these many
possible changes might impact HIE and vice versa. A significant part of this
chapter is devoted to investigating the relationships between HIE and programs
created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.
Finally Chapter 7 summarizes key contributions and recommendations and
offers suggestions for future research.
Chapter 2 Healthcare providers' decisions and values
for HIE: experiences from three communities
2.1 Prologue
This research in this chapter was conducted in 2007 and it reflects the
current knowledge at that time. Recent policy developments, such as the
meaningful use payments, are not mentioned except in the chapter epilogue,
which discusses the implications of this research in light of current policy.
2.2 Abstract
Despite the widely held expectation that health information exchange (HIE)
will improve healthcare, few examples of sustainable HIEs exist. To learn how
HIEs are established, we examined the needs, expectations and motivations of
key HIE stakeholders in three Massachusetts communities, by probing their
decision-making processes in selecting technical architectures for HIE. All three
eventually selected a hybrid architecture, which includes a central data repository.
Our findings suggest that to support sustainability in the long term, HIE efforts
must foster trust, appeal to strategic interests, and meet stakeholder
expectations of benefits from quality measurements. *
2.3 Introduction
According to one leader in HIE, "We desperately need, efficiently and
expeditiously, to learn what works and what doesn't." [69] Learning "what works
and what doesn't" in the realm of HIE is challenging not only because of the
dearth of successful models but also because knowledge of stakeholder needs,
expectations and motivations regarding HIE is severely lacking. [59] One way to
* The research in this chapter was published here: Rudin RS, Simon SR, Volk LA, Tripathi M, Bates D.
Understanding the decisions and values of stakeholders in health information exchanges: experiences from
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better understand these stakeholder characteristics is to investigate qualitatively
the factors that community members considered in selecting the organization
and technical architecture of their HIE.
When the stakeholders make these decisions, their individual and
collective values emerge implicitly and explicitly. Decisions of technical
architecture can therefore be viewed, in economists' terms, as "revealed
preferences." The final decisions and the reasons behind them provide a
revealing window into the stakeholders' perspective, bringing the complex
dynamics of creating an HIE into sharper focus and allowing us to infer the
factors that may help HIEs create value for their stakeholders and inform public
policies.
To gain insight, we conducted an evaluation of the Massachusetts eHealth
Collaborative (www.maehc.org), an organization overseeing the implementation
of HIE in three Massachusetts communities, each of which had representatives
choose their respective HIE technical architectures. For each of the three
communities, we investigated how the following eight factors influenced the
decision-making about the structure and technical architectural of their HIE:
security, cost, complexity of implementation, performance, ability to measure
quality of care, strategic goals, level of trust in the community, and stakeholders'
desire for independence.
2.4 Study methods
2.4.1 Overview
The Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative ("the Collaborative") was formed
in 2004, funded by a grant from Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts to
promote the adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) and HIE.* [6] Through
a request for proposals (RFP) process, the Collaborative chose three communities
in Massachusetts in which it planned to supply every physician with an EHR and
each community with HIE capabilities so that patient health data could be
electronically transferred among independent practices. The chosen communities
* Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative website contains RFPs and other relevant documents.
www.maehc.org (10 March 2008).
were Northern Berkshire, Greater Newburyport and Greater Brockton. The
Collaborative has covered all financial costs of the EHRs and HIE for several
years. The HIE products are currently being installed in the communities and
customized by the vendor companies chosen to implement each community's
HIE architecture, representing the culmination of an arduous process of selecting
vendors and technical architectures that occurred mostly in the summer of 2006.
During that time, Collaborative staff and community steering committees worked
together to choose the architecture and vendor that best met each community's
requirements.
2.4.2 Information sources
We conducted semi-structured interviews with members of the
Collaborative and with leadership from the three individual communities. We also
reviewed documentation that was used in the process of selecting vendors and
the specific HIE architectures. The interviews focused on drawing out the factors
deemed by the communities to be most critical in the selection of the overall
structure and technical architecture of the HIE. To provide context for the
decisions, we also asked about the processes employed by the decision-makers.
2.5 Results
We interviewed 14 key informants in the summer and fall of 2007,
approximately 12 months after their technical architecture decisions were made
and just prior to the completion of their HIE implementation. From these
interviews and relevant documentation, we found that three general
architectures were considered by each community. The process of selecting
between the architectures occurred over a period of several months, with the
first part of the process - establishing general guidelines and structure for the
HIE - common to all communities and driven by the Collaborative, and continuing
with each individual community making its own decisions about the specific
features of the HIE and the vendor to provide the system and services based on
its own criteria. The twin decisions of selecting a vendor and selecting a technical
architecture were found to be tightly linked and considered simultaneously by
each community. The final decisions for selecting technical architectures involved
the consideration of many factors.
2.5.1 Technical architectures
Three general architectural alternatives were considered by the
communities: fully centralized, peer-to-peer (P2P) and hybrid. (See table 1.1)
These alternatives describe the physical storage location of clinical data and the
way data are shared among the members of the HIE network. While the
distinction between these architectures may seem relatively unimportant, the
choice actually has many implications which include the balance between privacy
and ability to measure quality, which may affect likelihood of the HIE's success
and has important policy implications.
A fully centralized architecture stores all clinical data in one central
repository; no data are stored locally in physician offices. All clinical data stored
in the EHR would be shareable between community physicians. This architecture
is essentially a fully integrated EHR similar to what can be found in a unified
organization such as the Veterans Health Administration.
Opposite of the fully centralized architecture, the P2P approach - often
called a "federated" model - contains no centralized repository. Rather, clinical
data are stored at the physician practice that generated the data. Data
exchanges occur when a physician or other authorized healthcare provider sends
a query for a particular patient and then receives responses to the query from
any practices within the HIE network that have data on the patient. This
architecture requires physician practices to host and maintain data repositories
as well as servers that can access the repositories and respond to queries.
A hybrid architecture combines aspects of both the fully centralized and P2P
approaches. It uses a centralized repository but the repository is only a copy of a
portion of the data that are stored locally at each physician practice so that
physicians can still manage their own EHRs as they do in the P2P approach. Each
individual EHR "pushes" designated data elements of new patient data to the
centralized repository which can then be read by other community physicians.
Unlike the P2P approach, network-wide queries are unnecessary in the hybrid
approach and are replaced by direct accesses to the centralized repository from
any physician in the HIE network rendering the hybrid approach faster than P2P.
Other architectures beyond these three options are possible but were not
seriously considered by any of the communities.*
Fully
centralized Peer-to-peer Hybrid
Centralized repository Yes No Yes
Patient data stored in
physician's office No Yes Yes
Servers hosted in
physician's office No Yes No
Requires querying
network of servers for
clinical data No Yes No
Table 2.1: HIE Technical Architectures
2.5.2 Selection process and final decisions
Although each community ultimately made its own decision, the
Collaborative organization guided much of the process by working with physician
councils and privacy and security councils, and by educating the community
steering committees. Engaging these stakeholder groups resulted in broad
support in the communities for the selection process and final decisions. The
Collaborative began this process of selecting a company or companies to install
and manage the HIEs by issuing an RFP and then scrutinized the potential
vendors that submitted proposals. The community of Northern Berkshire, for
reasons described in the next section, did not participate in this vendor selection
process. The RFP required a detailed description of the vendor's technical
architecture solutions, privacy and security technology, integration and interface
approaches, cost information and a timeline for implementation.+ None of the
vendors had a fully developed solution that could accommodate each of the
three different HIE technical architectures without additional development. The
choice of technical architecture, therefore, would be constrained by the chosen
* A description of technical architectures can be found at the eHealth Initiative website.
toolkit.ehealthinitiative.org/technology/principlesaddendum4.mspx (1 March 2008).
* The RFP is available at the Collaborative Website at www.maehc.org; to promote interoperability, all
EHR products supported by the Collaborative are certified by the Certification Commission for Health
Information Technology and the HIE vendor is expected to comply with technical specifications from MA-
SHARE. www.mahealthdata.org/ma-share/ (1 March 2008).
vendor's software development capacity. Hence, vendor and architecture
selection were tightly linked and considered simultaneously.
Respondents to the RFP included approximately 17 vendor companies
among which 10 were seriously considered on the basis of cost and technical
appropriateness of the proposals. The Collaborative Board identified a task force
of members to oversee the HIE vendor selection process. This task force decided
that the communities would not be given any cost information except estimates
of what they would have to pay after the Collaborative pilot ended. This
approach would (1) avoid biasing the communities into thinking the more
expensive products were better [70] and (2) prevent proprietary vendor cost
information from being circulated. The 10 vendor applications were presented to
a technology review committee.
The technology review committee consisted of 20 technology experts from
a wide variety of healthcare organizations, members from each pilot community
and representatives from the Collaborative staff. Making decisions based on
consensus, this committee winnowed the RFP respondents from 10 to six and
then, with broader community participation, narrowed it down further to four
finalist companies, which were invited to give presentations and demonstrations.
Each of the three communities' experiences with the final selection process were
slightly different.
Northern Berkshire. A small community in the Berkshire Mountains of
western Massachusetts with roughly 15 physician practices, Northern Berkshire
settled on a vendor and technical architecture without extensive debate. This
community had agreed to adopt the same EHR vendor for every physician
practice in the community and it was therefore sensible to have that same
vendor provide the HIE product, obviating this community's participation in the
RFP described above. The vendor had been selected with the assurance that it
could implement the community's architecture of choice: the hybrid approach.
Greater Newburyport By all accounts, Newburyport's decision for a
technical architecture, a hybrid approach, was obvious and unanimous because
of its goal of measuring quality of care, but choosing a vendor proved more
challenging. Multiple vendors were deemed acceptable and none stood out as a
clearly superior. Factoring in not only technological capabilities and company
experience with HIE but also how well the vendor would be able to interact with
the community during the intensive installation and customization process, the
decision was finally resolved when Brockton - the largest of the communities -
settled on a vendor which was also one of the finalists for Newburyport. Most
people in the project felt that having one vendor provide HIE for both
communities would ease or avoid implementation challenges compared with
using two different vendors.
Greater Brockton. Whereas Northern Berkshire and Newburyport settled
on their technical architecture early, Brockton - a community with a diffuse and
competitive healthcare milieu formed out of six large provider institutions and
many smaller physician offices - deliberated the architecture question extensively.
The Brockton steering committee iteratively narrowed down the vendors to two
finalists based on criteria similar to those used in Newburyport: technology
capabilities, experience in HIE, and ability to work with the community. The
winning vendor was chosen in part because it claimed to be capable of
developing and implementing whatever technical architecture on which Brockton
would eventually settle. Initially leaning strongly toward the P2P approach, after
substantial deliberation the community eventually selected the same architecture
as the other two communities: the hybrid approach.
Thus, all communities chose the hybrid approach. However, reasons for
the decision varied across the communities.
2.5.3 Factors
All of the eight factors we investigated were considered by the
communities except cost because the Collaborative paid the HIE construction
fees and ongoing costs for the different architecture were either not determined
or the same across architectures.
Performance. Performance concerns for the P2P approach existed in all
communities. Integrating HIE into clinical workflows was expected to be
challenging even with very high performance. The expected delays of P2P could
exacerbate the workflow challenges and impair usability, resulting in slower
adoption of the HIE functionalities, especially in rural Northern Berkshire where
some providers had slower internet connections.
Complexity. The relatively high complexity of P2P was expected to delay
implementation of the HIE, particularly in Brockton. That community's selected
vendor emphasized the technical complexities and difficulties of implementing
P2P, which would involve over 50 servers (one in each practice), and argued for
the hybrid approach.
Security. Security was paramount to all communities but the steering
committees in Northern Berkshire and Newburyport did not view any architecture
as possessing inherently superior security. However, in Northern Berkshire
steering committee members felt that by establishing a rule that no physician's
EHR would ever accept any queries but only "push" the data to another location,
some "gut-level" security would be created. This rule eliminated the P2P
approach. Initially, Brockton thought P2P would be more secure because each
organization would be managing its own data, avoiding the establishment of a
large centralized repository of patient data. After further consideration, their view
on security reversed. Security for a centralized repository was thought to be
more robust compared with relying on the 50 servers of a P2P approach, each of
which would need to be secured individually. Furthermore, focus groups found
that patients did not view a centralized repository of health information as an
inherent security risk. Also, some steering committee members speculated that a
centralized repository would allow liability for security breaches to be transferred
from the individual providers to the centralized host, easing the burden on
providers.
Measuring quality of care. All communities were very motivated to use the
HIE for measuring quality of care and analysis which, they reasoned, would be
more easily accomplished through a hybrid approach compared to P2P, because
only a centralized repository would yield sufficient efficiency. Newburyport is
unique among the Collaborative communities in that its physicians and hospital
do collective contracting and pay-for-performance quality programs under a
single organization, the Lower Merrimac Valley Physician Hospital Organization.
Newburyport viewed the HIE as an opportunity to strengthen this organization's
care improvement and negotiating capabilities. Brockton, unlike the other
communities, had not emphasized community-wide quality analysis. Rather, this
community was more interested in quality measurements for individual
organizations. Community-wide quality programs were discussed but not an
important factor in the decision. Still, the ability to do quality analysis across the
sites of an individual organization favored a hybrid approach. All communities
hoped that the ability to measure quality of care would allow for the creation of
more value-added programs such as referral management and patient matching
with community specialists.
Strategic goals. All communities made the architecture decisions to align
with their strategic goals. The goal of improving healthcare quality was found in
every community. Additionally, Newburyport's community strategy included
providing more patient-centric care through a patient portal for which the
centralized repository of the hybrid model was viewed as more conducive than
P2P.
In Brockton, individual provider institutions initially argued for the P2P
approach in support of their strategic goals in an interesting way: at least one of
the larger provider organizations considered utilizing the community HIE to
integrate their own network of providers thereby helping the provider
organization achieve its corporate goals. The organization could still build a
redundant data exchange infrastructure, but having the HIE solve this problem
would save costs. Under this arrangement, although the organization would want
to utilize the service of the HIE, it would also want to avoid undue dependence
on an external organization. A P2P approach was perceived to represent less
dependence on the community compared with a hybrid approach because if the
institution were to separate from the community HIE, it could still leverage the
P2P exchange mechanism. This contrasts with the hybrid approach which would
bind the institution's integration plan to the community project.
The hybrid approach, however, also had strategic advantages which could
help both the individual institutions - through quality measurements - and the
community. The community could potentially benefit from the technical
architecture's scalability. If neighboring communities would be willing to pay a
fee to access Brockton's HIE, expanding to those communities could help achieve
sustainability. The hybrid approach was decidedly more scalable than P2P which
would involve more complexity and decreased performance with each additional
node.
Unlike Newburyport, a patient portal was not a part of Brockton's
architectural decision or community strategy. One Brockton community leader
called the patient portal functionality "icing on the cake." Brockton has yet to
decide if a community-wide portal will be implemented or if each institution will
offer its own.
Trust The communities varied in their level of trust among physician
practices at the start of the pilot, but in all communities trust seemed to increase
as a result of their participation in their HIEs. Northern Berkshire and
Newburyport had strong bonds of trust from the outset which continued into the
project. Because of this level trust in Northern Berkshire, HIE participants
allowed the data repository to be located at the local hospital. At the start of the
pilot, Brockton's healthcare providers, despite having a history of competition,
informally agreed not use technology to compete inside the community for
patients. That agreement formed the basis of more trusting relationships within
the community's network of healthcare providers. A sufficient level of trust was
achieved in Brockton to allow for the creation of a shared centralized repository.
Also, because of these bonds of trust, all participating providers were willing to
make their patients' data available for the HIE, data which are considered by
some healthcare providers in the country to be a competitive asset. [15] Plans in
every community to have clear policies and procedures for data access, which
included monitoring and sanctions, also increased trust and willingness to
exchange data.
Desire for independence. Despite a relatively high level of trust in
Northern Berkshire and Newburyport and a growing trust in Brockton, a
completely centralized approach was never seriously considered in any
community because the physicians wanted to operate their EHRs independent of
a centralized organization. Northern Berkshire briefly considered a completely
centralized approach but ultimately decided against it because it would have
involved commingling patient data from different physician practices which are
separate legal entities. For that same reason, the Collaborative would have
disallowed a centralized repository even if it was favored by a community.
In summary, Northern Berkshire's selection was influenced primarily by
performance and the ability to measure quality of care. In Newburyport, the
ability to measure quality of care and creating a working patient portal were the
dominating factors. Brockton's deliberations involved almost every one of the
factors we investigated but, in the end, the ability to measure quality of care and
potential for future sustainability favored the hybrid approach. Every community
was found to have gained considerable trust as a result of participation in the
Collaborative pilot.
2.6 Discussion
All three communities selected the hybrid approach for an HIE technical
architecture. However, the three communities differed somewhat in the reasons
behind their selections. Choosing a technical architecture for HIE was much more
than a question of optimizing technical variables; rather, it was deeply connected
to the values of the key stakeholders in their particular circumstances.
Because in every community, every willing healthcare provider received an EHR,
was invited to participate in the HIE, and had representation on the steering
committee, each community's technical architecture decision is likely to reflect
the values of the entire community. In contrast, many RHIOs begin as a small
number of large institutions that design the infrastructure without involvement
from local providers to which they may expand. This study, therefore, may better
illuminate the values of communities and the factors they consider when
embarking on HIE, though it may not be representative of organic RHIO
development in other communities.
Two other studies also use qualitative methods to evaluate specific HIEs.
A study on the Santa Barbara County Care Data Exchange is a detailed history
which includes the reasons for that project's demise, claiming that the
experience "illustrates the danger that in some communities, unfavorable short-
term private value propositions for simple HIE services may delay more
advanced HIE services with greater potential medium- and long-term
private/societal payoff." [31] By elucidating the perspectives of key stakeholders,
our study advances this discussion of value propositions and leads to identifying
those that may be favorable in the short- and long-term.
A case study on the Indiana HIE describes a working HIE which consists
of five health systems but only some of the office practices in the community.
[30] In contrast to the current study, it describes how to build an HIE organically
without the inclusion of all community practices, and does not directly address
expectations, needs, and motivations of key stakeholders.
The reasoning of the stakeholders surrounding many of the factors -
some of which were found to be related - offers a view into their perspective.
Security, while a strong concern, was not found to be a major barrier to HIE.
However, a significant level of trust between the community stakeholders and by
patients with respect to the security of their data was requisite. Stakeholders'
desire for independence was also not a major barrier to HIE, but a significant
level of trust was also needed for this to be true. That trust was found to be
important is not surprising. Social capital, for which trust is an important
component, has been recognized as the "primary foundation for an HIE." [71]
Performance was found to be important in its effect on workflow, showing that
healthcare providers are very concerned about how to integrate the HIE into
their daily routines.
Finally, each community had different strategic goals. Important to
Newburyport's strategy was a patient portal. Some Brockton providers planned to
use the HIE to address their own corporate goals. All communities identified the
ability to measure quality as a strategic goal, but differences were found in that
Northern Berkshire and Newburyport expected community-wide quality
measurements and Brockton expected measurements principally for individual
providers and institutions.
While none of the communities chose to adopt a single EHR for multiple
practices because of legal concerns, an EHR may be designed to address these
concerns by labeling patients data with the practice name from which it
originated. However, many providers may want to retain flexibility in their IT
investments and refuse to share EHR resources with providers in different
practices.
Our findings and analysis demonstrate that examining the technical
architecture decisions for HIEs can illuminate many of the needs, expectations
and motivations of stakeholders.
2.7 Policy implications
This study found that the perspectives of key HIE stakeholders centered
on three aspects: level of trust, strategic interests, and benefits from quality
measurements. How effectively an HIE addresses these aspects may largely
determine its ability to become established and achieve long-term success.
"What are the levels of trust among the stakeholder group and what are the
conditions and issues that affect this trust?" asks one study. [59] The experience
of the Collaborative communities supports the argument that trust is a critical
factor in the construction of HIEs and suggests that trust can be created in a
community through participation in a community-wide HIE effort. This is
particularly evident in Brockton, probably the community most representative of
the US healthcare system because of its large, diffuse, and competitive
healthcare market. Brockton's experience is a positive sign that competing
providers may be able to collaborate for the sake of the community in certain
circumstances. The willingness of providers to have their patients' data
exchanged in the HIE rather than treating the data as a competitive asset is
another optimistic sign that trust can be created in a community. However,
receiving a grant of the EHRs and HIE infrastructure may have been necessary
for this trust to develop.
Trust is necessary for establishing an HIE, but it is not sufficient. A study
of the factors that contribute to efficient and successful use of IT in various
industries recommends that the government should "make policy decisions that
turn [healthcare] IT into a competitive weapon." [15] This implies that to be
successful and sustainable, HIEs must appeal to stakeholders' strategic interests.
The experiences of the Collaborative pilot communities suggest how appealing to
the strategic interests of individual healthcare providers as well as those of the
communities as a whole can be accomplished.
Participating in the HIE may become competitively advantageous to the
individual providers through administrative savings and by retaining existing
patients and attracting new patients. Despite Brockton's informal agreement not
to use technology to compete inside the community, if patients recognize the
value of the HIE, it will be in providers' strategic interests to continue
participating. The experience of the Indiana HIE shows that benefits of
administrative savings can also motivate continued participation. [30] Because
the value of the HIE increases with increased membership - a phenomenon
called a "network externality" - the strong incentive to continue participating in
the HIE is contingent upon having a critical mass of participants. [72] By
engaging entire communities, the Collaborative pilot communities have
undoubtedly exceeded the critical mass needed to make participation in the HIE
a competitive advantage. For an HIE that grows more organically, it is not clear
when this critical point may be reached.
Although appealing to the strategies of individual stakeholders will be
important to strengthen their engagement, it is likely to be community strategies
that will be crucial for sustainability. HIE may even be used to attract new
patients to the community and to retain them. HIE would therefore be a
competitive weapon for the community as a whole. Our findings suggest that the
size of a community will likely affect its propensity for acting in the community's
strategic interests - and very large and expansive communities in particular may
have difficulty working together.
Several studies argue that the presence of a diverse set of proprietary
exchange projects such as hospital-physician portals could thwart efforts to
establish HIEs by lessening the comparative benefits of a community HIE. [41]
[73] [43] The reasons the communities in this study have not found this to be a
barrier are probably that the benefits of receiving EHRs and HIE at no charge
outweighed competitive goals of individual institutions and that few data
exchange agreement were in place when the project began.
This study suggests that HIE success may also depend, in part, on how
effectively quality measurement is addressed. Quality measurements might
motivate providers to stay engaged in an HIE by facilitating pay-for-performance
programs, increasing providers' reputation, or by providing information to better
match patients' needs with community providers. However, communities that
have providers less willing to have the quality of their care measured may view
this capability as an obstacle instead of a motivator. [41]
This study provides evidence that HIEs may be successful if policies and
programs foster trust, appeal to strategic interests, and provide benefits from
quality measurement. Other business models which involve payments from
patients directly for use of personal health records or from drug or medical
device companies who use the data for marketing have been proposed but have
not yet been fully tested. [74] If HIEs are to be sustainable, policymakers and
HIE organizations should consider these factors when establishing HIEs. If HIEs
do not account for these factors, HIEs may not provide sufficient value to
healthcare providers and sustainability will continue to be a challenge.
2.8 Study limitations
While this study identifies some of the needs, motivations, and
expectations of healthcare providers toward HIE, it would be premature to draw
strong conclusions about "what works and what doesn't" because only one of the
three Collaborative projects have become operational. Also, the information was
collected for a specific decision point prior to implementation and does not
capture changes in the stakeholders' perspectives over time. Finally, the results
may not be representative of other communities, especially because the costs of
EHRs and the HIEs were borne by the Collaborative and because the
communities were volunteers rather than a random sample.
2.9 Conclusions
The experiences of the three Collaborative pilot communities provide a
revealing characterization of the perspectives of key HIE stakeholders. One
overarching insight is that it appears unlikely that any of the communities would
have moved to develop HIE very rapidly without assistance from the
Collaborative. Important aspects of the stakeholders' perspective include
community-wide trust, strategic interests of the healthcare providers and of the
community as a whole, and benefits derived from measuring quality of care. All
communities ultimately selected a hybrid approach, which may be superior to the
other two architectures; the selection process appeared helpful in engaging the
communities. It remains to be seen if this effort or any HIE in the country can
provide direct benefits from community-wide quality measurements or other
activities. Without such benefits, HIE sustainability may remain precarious.
2.10 Epilogue
Of the three communities studied in this chapter, only the Northern
Berkshire HIE became operational. The HIEs in Newburyport and Brockton never
got up and running and have suspended their efforts, largely because of
technical issues related to the different vendors failure to integrate their HIE and
EHR products. Northern Berkshire had fewer technical integration issues
presumably because they used the same vendor for the HIE and all community
EHRs. The experiences of these communities underscore the technical difficulty
of integrating these complex clinical systems.
The meaningful use payments may help to overcome these technical
issues by requiring providers to use certified vendors as a condition of receiving
payments. The payments may also influence the values of the participating
providers discussed in this chapter to some extent, by changing their strategic
interests and overcome trust issues so that they are more motivated to engage
in HIE. However, the meaningful use criteria most relevant to HIE has not yet
been specified and it remains to be seen if these incentives and new technical
standards will be sufficient to foster HIE at a substantial scale.
Chapter 3 What affects clinicians' usage of HIE?
3.1 Abstract'
Relatively little is known about what factors affect clinicians' usage of HIE.
We performed a qualitative study using grounded theory and interviewed
clinician-users and HIE staff of one operational HIE with advanced data
exchange functionality. Seventeen clinicians were interviewed for one hour each
about what factors affect their HIE usage. Five HIE staff were asked about
technology and training issues to provide context. Interviews were recorded,
transcribed and analyzed. Clinicians were motivated to access the HIE by
perceived improvements in care quality and time savings, but their motivation
was moderated by a long list of factors including gaps in data, workflow issues
and usability issues. Data contributions to the HIE were affected by billing
concerns and time constraints. The study was limited in that only more intensive
users of HIE were recruited and was restricted to one community and small
number of specialties. Policies should create incentives for HIEs to assist
clinicians' integration of HIE into their workflows, develop measures of HIE
contributions and accesses, and create incentives for clinicians to contribute data
to HIEs.
3.2 Introduction
Of more than one hundred HIEs in the United States, few are operational
and even fewer have advanced data exchange capabilities such as providing
access to a wide range of data that originate from many different medical
practices as aggregate patient-centric records. [19] Most are focused on more
basic functionality such as the delivery of laboratory results. Even if HIEs
supported more advanced data exchange capabilities, clinicians may not find it
valuable enough to use them if there are large data gaps or the interfaces are
difficult to use.
' The contents of this chapter were published here: Rudin R, Volk L, Simon S, Bates D: What affects
clinicians? usage of health information exchange? Appl Clin Inf 2011; 2: 250?262
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The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 commits
approximately $27 billion to stimulate the adoption of health information
technology over the next several years. Most of the criteria for receiving
payments related to HIE have not yet been determined but will be decided soon
and official statements suggest that they will require advanced HIE functionality
in the form of "access to comprehensive patient data." [47] We did not find any
studies, however, that have empirically assessed an operational HIE with this
kind of advanced data exchange functionality. If the meaningful use criteria are
not informed by the real-world experience of clinicians using this kind of
functionality with current HIE technology, they may not result in clinicians using
HIEs in a way that realizes their potential value.
To address these issues, we explored the factors that affect clinicians' HIE
usage and how clinicians value advanced data exchange functionality in a
community HIE in Massachusetts that has been operational for more than two
years. This HIE provides its advanced data exchange capability through an
aggregate record for each patient and encompasses most physician practices in
the community. We investigated the factors that affect both how physicians
contribute data to the HIE and how they access it. An understanding of these
factors may help to guide public policies that aim to foster HIE usage,
particularly the remaining stages of the meaningful-use criteria for receiving
ARRA stimulus payments.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Community and HIE
Northern Berkshire, a community in western Massachusetts of
approximately 45,000 people, 80 physicians and one hospital, was selected as a
pilot site in 2005 by the Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative to demonstrate a
community-wide implementation of electronic health records (EHR) and HIE. The
pilot program covered the costs of EHRs for all physician practices in the
community who were willing to participate, which included almost all of the
physicians, and for the construction of an HIE to allow aggregate patient records
to be available for access by participating clinicians.[75] The HIE's servers were
located at the hospital and the HIE was administered by hospital staff. At the
beginning of this study, which ran from October 2009 through February 2010,
the HIE had been operational for more than two years.
HIE data included problem lists, medications, allergies, immunizations,
procedures, social and family histories, vital signs, dates of previous physician
visits and names of those physicians, laboratory results and demographic
information. Textual notes were excluded from the initial phase of exchange due
to privacy concerns. These data were collected from clinicians in the community
who elected to participate and from those patients who signed a consent form.
Over 95% of patients opted in to allow their data to be aggregated in the HIE.
Office-based clinicians had the option to link patients in their EHR to the HIE,
which allowed them to access the HIE directly from their EHR without the need
to search for the patient for every access. This was possible because the same
vendor was used for EHRs in all of the office-based practices and for the HIE (a
community decision to ease integration issues). When accessing the HIE directly
from the EHR, the HIE data were displayed in a separate pane and those data
could be easily imported into the EHR. The HIE was also available to any
participating clinician through a Web portal, which required the clincians to
search for the patient for each access and did not allow data to be imported into
the clinicians' EHR. In this phase of the HIE implementation, the hospital did not
contribute data and hospital users could only access the HIE via the Web portal.
3.3.2 Study participants and recruitment
In total, we interviewed 20 key informants which included 15 clinician-
users, one HIE trainer, one IT staff member for the HIE, the hospital executive
who supervised the HIE's operations, one director of support services for a large
medical practice, and an administrative assistant for the same large medical
practice. The clinician-users included 6 at the hospital, 8 at office-based practices,
and one who split his time between the hospital and an office practice. Of the
clinician-users interviewed, 11 were physicians. Primary care, nursing and several
specialties were represented. The clinicians worked in large, medium and solo
practices.
We identified these clinicians through personal contacts and HIE access
logs, and then found several key informants through recommendations, the
"snowball" method.[76] Because it was a small community, we believe we talked
to most of the clinicians who used the HIE regularly in their practice. We did not
actively seek clinicians who never used the HIE. However, we did include a few
clinicians who had used it minimally but were aware of available HIE functionality.
3.3.3 Data collection and analysis
We used grounded theory to characterize the factors that influenced
clinicians' use of HIE functionality. [77] Grounded theory involves collecting data
to arrive at categories and their properties which describe and explain real-world
phenomena, but does not address statistical significance of findings. In
accordance with grounded theory's method of theoretical sampling, we modified
and refined our questions between interviews based on the key informants'
responses. We started with open-ended questions (e.g. "How do you use the HIE
in your clinical practice?") followed by more focused questions to elucidate all
aspects of the factors that might affect a clinician's use of the HIE. The initial set
of these focused questions was derived from the authors' experience, IT
adoption literature, and documented experiences of HIT and HIE.[78] [41] [31]
[56] The interviews were conducted in person (15) or over the phone (5) and
most lasted one hour. We conducted the interviews, transcribed them from
recordings, and analyzed the content of the transcripts to formulate categories.
After each round of between 2 and 4 interviews, we refined the categories based
on the clinicians' experience as recorded in the transcripts. We formulated the
categories and their properties by consensus among the authors. When the
interviews no longer resulted in new categories or properties, we assumed that
we had reached "saturation" and stopped recruiting key informants, but we
believe we interviewed most of the regular users of the HIE in the community.
3.4 Results
We found a wide range of usage intensity. There were many factors that
affected the frequency with which clinicians' accessed the HIE for information
and relatively few that affected the frequency with which they contributed data
to it. We grouped factors that affected accesses into two categories: motivators
and moderators. Motivators are the ultimate reasons clinicians access the HIE
(Figure 3.1). Moderators facilitate or inhibit clinicians' access of the HIE (Figure
3.2). To facilitate presentation of results, we organized moderators into groups
as they related to patient, clinician and the HIE. We explain the factors that
affect accesses, describe the range of intensities of HIE accesses found among
the clinician-users, and present the factors that affect data contributions to the
HIE.
3.4.1 Motivators of HIE accesses
Most active clinical users believed accessing the HIE helped them deliver
better quality care by supplying them with relevant clinical data in a timely
manner. Almost all active users of the HIE believed it had the potential to
improve care even further if specific issues concerning data content and usability
were addressed.
Several clinicians believed that the HIE saved them time, in part, through
avoided phones calls to request clinical data from other physician offices,
hospitals, pharmacies, and patients' relatives. A hospitalist believed it obviated
more than 75% of such phone calls, saving him significant time. Most clinicians
believed verifying a medication and allergy list was faster than creating one de
novo. For office based EHRs, which allowed direct importing of data from the HIE,
the HIE expedited documentation, especially for patients new to the practice.
Several clinicians believed that information gathered through the HIE facilitated
interviews with patients and reduced the need to ask them as many questions.
None of the clinicians mentioned cost as a motivating factors for accessing the
HIE.
3.4.2 Moderators of HIE accesses: patient-related factors
Clinicians found the HIE more valuable for patients who had trouble
communicating, who lacked family members to assist them, and who suffered
from multiple or complex medical conditions. Emergency clinicians believed the
HIE held considerable potential value to improve the efficiency by which patient
information relevant to an emergency department visit could be found.
The pattern of patients' visits was also thought to be a significant moderator. For
patients who only visited one practice for all their care, or who went outside of
the community for care and therefore associated data would not be available in
the community's self-contained HIE, clinicians had little reason to access the HIE.
Conversely, for new patients with data in the system, clinicians found the HIE
very valuable by saving time in gathering clinical information. Participating
primary care doctors, however, may have had limited benefit in this regard
because few were accepting new patients.
3.4.3 Moderators of HIE accesses: clinician-related factors
Many clinicians believed that their particular medical specialty determined
how valuable the HIE would be. A pediatrician who used the HIE infrequently did
not believe many pediatric care visits had problems with missing clinical
information because consulting physicians usually forwarded their medical notes
back to this clinician via fax. A psychiatrist who also accessed the HIE
infrequently believed the HIE would not be valuable for his specialty because
psychiatric problems do not change often and are isolated from other medical
conditions. Both hospitalists interviewed, by contrast, checked the HIE (using the
Web-based portal) for almost all admitted patients, partly because of their
obligation to obtain complete medication lists.
The interviewed clinicians varied in how effectively they integrated HIE
into their complex workflows. Even with our sample biased toward high intensity
users, several physicians were unaware of how to access the HIE directly from
their EHR, did not know about the ability to import data from the HIE, or simply
did not think to check it to find missing patient data. Many clinicians noted that
information sources they were accustomed to using "competed" with the HIE,
such as a hospital portal which contained relatively complete patient data but for
hospital visits only.
Extant information exchange processes using paper and fax may also
have reduced the frequency with which physicians accessed the HIE. Many
offices routinely faxed clinical notes to other providers in the community for
referrals or in response to chart requests, decreasing the need for the HIE.
Clinicians believed that specialists outside of the community were far less reliable
in sending their notes but, because they were not part of the HIE, the HIE could
not be used to acquire clinical information from their practices. Requesting
clinical notes via fax, while more time consuming than using HIE, had the
advantage of containing textual notes, which were excluded from this HIE.
How clinicians coordinated with each other within their practices also affected
HIE accesses. One practice adapted their workflow so that either the physician or
a nurse would routinely check the HIE for all new patients. Another physician, by
contrast, believed that it was faster to simply tell his assistant to call another
office than for him to check the HIE and had not thought to ask his assistant to
check the HIE instead.
Some clinicians admitted that they had a general aversion to changing
their practice workflow, especially after a stressful process of installing an EHR.
Time constraints, especially in primary and emergency care, also tended to
reduce motivations for accessing the HIE. On the other hand, clinicians working
during non-business hours found the HIE particularly valuable because other
means of obtaining clinical information were unavailable.
3.4.4 Moderators of HIE accesses: HIE-related factors
Almost all clinicians noted and complained about gaps in the HIE's data.
Textual notes were not included in the HIE for confidentiality reasons and, while
many clinicians understood the privacy concerns, the lack of notes made the HIE
much less valuable. For office-based clinicians, a major issue was that the
hospital was not contributing any data into the HIE, severely limiting its value
and necessitating clinicians to access the separate hospital portal in addition to
the HIE for an adequate picture of the patient's previous care. The hospital had
planned to integrate its data into the HIE but that functionality had not been
completed at the time of this study.
Other data gaps were attributed to local practices that withdrew from or
opted out of the HIE, including a primary care practice of several physicians,
significantly reducing the amount of potentially valuable data in the HIE. For
patients who did visit participating clinical practices, clinicians could not be
certain why their HIE searches sometimes returned a lack of results, but they
cited two possible reasons: patients occasionally refused consent, and
contributing physicians sometimes did not "lock their notes" on their EHR, a
software action that was required to send the clinical data into the HIE repository.
Because the patient consent rate was quite high (approximately 95% of patients)
the lack of timely note-locking was probably the major reason for unexpected
gaps in HIE data.
In addition to completeness issues, many clinicians mentioned usability
difficulties with the HIE. Hospital clinicians believed accessing the HIE through
the Web portal involved "too many clicks." This was less of a problem in the
office practices which were able to access the HIE more easily. Clinicians were
also discouraged from using the HIE by the inability to find easily what changed
since the previous visit, the requirement to change passwords frequently, and a
login and search process for the Web portal that could take more than a minute
yet often did not result in new or useful data.
HIE accesses were also affected by many technical difficulties such as
software glitches and versioning issues with the EHRs and hardware, which
resulted in frequent downtimes that lasted hours or longer, even after two years
of operation.
We also asked about several other factors which were not found to
moderate HIE accesses. Those who had heard of the ARRA meaningful-use
payments said it had no effect on their access habits but some suggested it
could become a factor. Trustworthiness was not a significant factor in accessing
the HIE: all providers trusted the accuracy of the data but many would still verify
it with the patient or another data source. Technical support for HIE was not
found to be useful enough to them to access the HIE more frequency.
3.4.5 HIE access intensities
We found wide variation in clinicians' HIE access habits. The most
intensive users accessed the HIE before almost every patient visit, using the HIE
data as a starting point for the clinical encounter. These users included two
hospitalists, one hospital nurse and one office-based pulmonologist. An office-
based urologist was the next most intensive user, checking the HIE only if the
patient was sent from a participating practice, which he estimated was about 40-
50% of patient visits. An emergency care nurse and an office-based pediatrician
checked the HIE only when they were missing information and if the primary
care physician was from a participating practice, which they estimated amounted
to less than 10% of visits for the nurse and less than 1% of visits for the
pediatrician. Two assistants in office-based practice used the HIE for every new
patient to import demographics and existing health data before the appointment.
A surgeon's assistant in an office practice accessed the HIE for every patient new
to the practice's database to import patient records but found data for only about
10% of the searches for new patients. An emergency physician and a hospital
nurse both tried the HIE via the Web portal many times but stopped using it
because they felt it took too long and required too many clicks to access data;
when they were able to access the data, they found the information largely not
helpful. A pathologist used the HIE via the Web portal for about two months but
found that for most samples in which the HIE might be valuable, the ordering
physician had not locked their note in time, so the pathologist stopped accessing
the HIE. Despite specifically trying to do so, we could not identify a primary care
physician who regularly checked the HIE. One primary care doctor tried it, found
it difficult to use and stopped. The psychiatrist we interviewed accessed the HIE
rarely and did not often find it valuable.
3.4.6 Factors affecting data contribution
Data from each visit would be automatically contributed to the HIE
immediately after a clinician "locked" his or her notes, which was accomplished
when the clinician performed a software action that indicated the documentation
for the visit was complete. Note-locking was the only way for a clinician to
contribute data to the HIE. We found that note-locking was affected by the
following factors: billing concerns, time constraints, and a dislike or lack of
awareness of the ability to add addenda to notes. Clinicians' note-locking habits
varied considerably. One clinician compulsively locked her notes within a few
hours of the patient visit. One practice adopted the policy of locking notes
exactly one week after the visit to allow time for their billing department to check
for errors. One primary care physician locked notes on an ad hoc basis
"whenever it pops into my head." One specialist was about 3 months behind in
his notes. Another physician, after a billing error resulted in lost income, stopped
locking notes altogether.
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Figure 3.1: Clinicians' Motivators for HIE Use
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Figure 3.2: Moderators of HIE Usage as Related to Patients, Clinicians and the HIE
3.5 Discussion
Our results from investigating an operational community-wide HIE
provides an early indication of how HIE capabilities may be used with a current
HIE product implementation and reveals many factors that may affect clinicians'
usage of the aggregate record form of HIE. We confirmed that clinicians may
derive significant benefits from accessing this form of HIE, benefits which include
perceived improvements in quality of care and time savings from searching for
and documenting clinical information. However, we have also found a long list of
potential moderators of these benefits which, if not addressed, may result in
clinicians using this form of HIE minimally or not at all. This underuse could
diminish much of the potential value of an HIE. Some types of clinicians accessed
the HIE much more than others, and had good reasons for doing so, suggesting
that incentives targeted at providers may need to consider these factors.
We found few other studies that explicitly investigated the factors that
influence HIE usage, or even reported the volumes of HIE usage for individual
clinicians. [79] [66] One study mentioned two of the same moderators of HIE
accesses that we found: the extent of physician participation, and existing
electronic and paper processes. [31] Our results are consistent with findings
from a study of the United Kingdom's analogous HIE effort, which found an
"inherent imbalance between people who must work to upload patients' [clinical
records] (general practitioners and their staff) and those who will see its benefits
more directly (staff working in emergency settings)." [80] Clinicians did not have
incentives to lock their notes in a timely manner because they were not the ones
who benefited directly from having those data available.
Hincapie et al studied physicians' perceptions of an HIE in Arizona
regarding its impact on health outcomes and cost, but did not specifically
address factors that would affect usage. [81] That study mentions several of the
motivators and moderators that we found in our study including, most notably,
the lack of complete data as a barrier. This is not surprising because the HIE in
that study lacked data from community ambulatory practices. Also the HIE in
that study was only in operation for 3 months at the time of the study. The HIE
we investigated had been operational for more than 2 years.
Vest et al attempted to determine HIE usage factors in one HIE in Texas
by quantitatively analyzing how certain factors, which they derived from
information management theory, affected ED physician's HIE usage as evidenced
in audit logs.[79] It is difficult to assess the significance of that study because it
does not report the number of HIE users or any characteristics of those users.
They found that accesses of the HIE were lower during busy days, as expected.
However, they also found surprising results. For example, they "noticed a
degradation of usage over time" and "system usage was lower when the patient
was unfamiliar to the facility." These results are difficult to interpret without
qualitative research. The study by Vest et al illustrates the limitations of trying to
measure quantitative relationships with only limited knowledge of context. We
took the opposite approach: deriving usage factors by speaking with the users
directly - the two approaches are clearly complementary.
Several studies have investigated clinicians' and provider organizations'
perceptions and expectations of HIE. [56] [82] [83] [37] [84] [85] However,
these studies are limited in that few if any of their respondents had any
experience actually using HIE functionality and one is also limited to emergency
physicians.[82] One moderating factor of HIE usage that we found, patient visit
patterns, has been investigated by two studies but they were limited to ED or
inpatient visits. [64] [68]
While HIEs may vary in stakeholder composition and technical approach,
most HIEs that attempt to implement advanced data exchange capabilities such
as aggregate patient records will likely encounter many of the same factors
affecting HIE usage that we found in this pioneering community. This is because
most HIEs face the same market for technology vendors and clinicians have
similar incentives for participation and usage of HIE. There is little evidence that,
under current market conditions and technology sophistication, vendors will be
able to address the issues that are most important for making HIEs valuable to
clinicians, such as building adequate privacy functionality to allow the exchange
of clinical notes with only specific providers. The HIE we studied had many
technical issues even after two years of operation. More specific and widely
adopted technical standards may facilitate this kind of integration to some extent
but there will likely be a need for custom software for most HIE implementations.
[86] HIE organizations may also have difficulty addressing underuse of HIE
because of all the potential usage moderators and because they will likely have
little leverage with HIE vendors to customize their products as they desire.
Homegrown HIE products, while more adaptable, are expensive to construct and
not possible for most communities.
3.6 Policy implications
To realize the potential value of HIE, clinicians, HIE and EHR product
vendors and HIE trainers will need to work toward integrating HIE into clinical
workflows and consider the social and technical aspects of technology
adoption.[87] It is unlikely that this kind of integration will happen on a large
scale without public policies that influence the factors identified in this study.
Several factors of HIE usage are beyond the control of the healthcare delivery
system and the influence of public policy, such as whether patients have trouble
communicating their medical history. Other factors may be influenced only by
fundamental reforms of clinicians' incentive structure: accountable care
organizations and patient-centered medical home efforts may alter patient visit
patterns and result in increased HIE usage by physicians more motivated to
create complete documentation of their patients' medical history.[88] [89] Yet,
these reforms may not be possible to implement without established HIEs in the
first place. We did, however, find several important factors that may be
amenable to public policy interventions that aim to foster HIE.
Public policies directed at clinician-users, HIE and EHR product vendors,
and HIE organizations can foster HIE by addressing several of the factors that
moderate HIE usage (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3: Policy Levers for Clinician Usage and Value of HIE
3.6.1 Clinician-users
Our results suggest that the absence of one large medical group such as a
hospital may significantly diminish the potential value of an HIE. However, simply
encouraging membership in an HIE may not be a strong enough incentive. In
addition, clinicians must be required to lock their notes, or the equivalent
operation, in a timely fashion so that other clinicians, and secondary applications,
can benefit from their clinical documentation. Billing concerns should not prevent
clinical data from being made available in an HIE. Making meaningful-use
payments contingent on timely note-locking, at least for a certain proportion of
notes, could make HIEs more valuable.
Creating incentives for clinicians to access an HIE may not be the best
approach. Our data suggest that the frequency with which physicians access the
HIE is likely to vary widely by specialty, and providers had good clinical reasons
for this. Incentives for clinicians to access an HIE, therefore, should take this
variation into account, including appropriate minimal requirements for frequency
of access. If these minimal requirements are set too high, incentives may result
in "gaming" in which the HIE is accessed solely to receive an incentive payment
rather than for clinical reasons.
3.6.2 HIE organizations
Currently, HIE organizations face enormous challenges, including defining
their mission, satisfying various stakeholders, achieving sustainability and
choosing technology vendors. [19] Discussions of usage seem to get lost amid all
of these other deep concerns, though they should not. Public policies may
provide HIEs with badly needed direction.
We suggest that HIEs should be more than technology providers. They
should also provide HIE-related workflow services, in partnership with regional
extension centers. Our results show that initial training in HIE is not enough;
clinicians need help integrating HIE into their workflows. Even brief one-on-one
demonstrations with clinicians of how to use the HIE after the initial trainings
may increase contributions and accesses substantially. HIE organizations should
be held accountable for the extent to which clinicians utilize their services.
Metrics of data contributions and accesses by clinician-users can be used
as core benchmarks for assessing an HIE's effectiveness. Monitoring metrics of
data contributions will motivate HIEs to encourage and assist clinicians to lock
their notes in a timely fashion, expand coverage to more patients and practices,
and make patient consent processes more efficient. Monitoring metrics of HIE
data accesses will motivate HIEs to help clinicians integrate HIE into their
workflows, solve technology issues quickly and minimize downtimes. These
metrics may provide one early step in the development of "more sophisticated
measures of HIE use." [67]
Because only a small portion of the ARRA payments are available to HIEs
directly, incentives for HIEs to provide workflow services may be created through
other policy levers such as by requiring, as a part of HIE organizational
certification or for grants, reports of HIE usage metrics or whether those metrics
meet certain targets.
3.6.3 HIE and EHR product vendors
Policies that target clinicians and HIE organizations will be critically
dependent on capabilities of HIE products to report relevant metrics for data
contributions to the HIE and frequencies of accesses. HIE products, therefore,
should be required to support these capabilities as part of conformance testing.
Some such metrics may be implemented anyway, even without such a
requirement, for purposes of maintaining audit trails and to facilitate HIE
management and will therefore likely not be a significant burden on vendors.
However, without conformance testing or a similar policy requirement, the
metrics may not be standardized or accurate.
Public policy may also play an important role in shaping the market for
HIE and EHR products so that they are more easily integrated and easier for
clinicians to use, either through certification, conformance testing, or
requirements for products to disclose the presence or absence of capabilities.
HIE software is complex and many purchasing provider groups may not
understand the specific features without certified definitions. Exporting clinical
data into an HIE will likely be most effective if done independently of the clinician
unless they clearly designate material as not to be shared. If data exchange is to
depend on the physician, however, the EHR and HIE vendors could greatly
facilitate the exchange by, for example, allowing clinicians the option of a
"preliminary" lock that uploads clinical data to the HIE but still allows subsequent
changes to the medical documentation. Such a feature may raise liability issues if
clinicians share information that was meant to be only preliminary and other
clinicians act on it. Clinicians will have to understand what software actions will
make data available for other clinicians to view and how that data might be
interpreted or misinterpreted. Further research is needed to better understand
how this kind of communication might happen and who should be held liable in
the event of a misinterpretation and harm done to a patient.
Possible usability improvements which could be required for conformance
testing include: a unified display of all patient data integrated with the native
EHR data; an icon or other flag that indicates the HIE contains new information;
the ability to automatically import data directly into an EHR; the ability to
distinguish data that are new as of the previous visit; and automatic name look-
up functionality to the HIE to facilitate linking patients between EHRs and HIEs.
Vendors should also be required to demonstrate which other HIE or EHR
products they have already integrated with and which would require additional
development.
Policies must be flexible so that they foster innovation in how HIE data are
integrated into clinical workflows. For example, if a product contains a unified
display that incorporates HIE data into an EHR, clinicians should not be required
to access a separate portal to demonstrate that they are meaningful users of HIE.
However, the EHR software should still be required to verify that the HIE data
did appear on the screen for the clinician to see.
3.6.4 Integrating HIEs with Direct Project
The federal government recently created the Direct Project to establish
protocols for secure point-to-point communication among healthcare providers.
[90] This type of communication might provide an initial step toward more
advanced clinical data exchange. However, the Direct Project will not substitute
for the aggregate patient record form of HIE. Aggregate patient records offer
several advantages which the Direct Project does not. For example, aggregate
patient records would allow clinicians to query for data rather than requiring the
data to be sent to them, which is important because there will likely still be
instances of missing data even if the information could be transmitted
electronically using the Direct Project's protocols.[7] [9] [4] Also, there will be
secondary uses of having an aggregate patient record such as quality
measurement, disease registries and public health surveillance.[14] If the Direct
Project protocols are well-integrated into HIEs so that clinicians can easily
manage messages received via the Direct Project together with data in an HIE's
aggregate patient records, the Direct Project may provide an additional incentive
for clinicians to participate in an HIE by reducing the complexity of their
workflows. However, if a point-to-point communication infrastructure is
implemented separately from HIE organizations, it may reduce the frequency
with which clinicians access HIE data because clinicians will be required to
manage two separate information flows - in addition to faxes, paper mailings,
and telephone calls to and from clinicians who have not yet adopted the Direct
Project functionalities. Policies, should, therefore ensure that HIE organizations
and the Direct Project efforts are judiciously integrated.
3.7 Study limitations
This study has several limitations. We focused on the experience of one
community and therefore may have overlooked factors related to HIE usage that
vary by community and HIE implementation, especially because only one EHR
vendor was used for all contributing providers. We had planned to study two
other HIEs in Massachusetts which included multiple vendors, but both failed,
underscoring the challenges of establishing the aggregate record form of HIE
with multiple vendors. Communities with diverse EHR vendors may face even
more technical, compatibility, and usability issues, which may suggest an even
greater need for strong policy actions. Another limitation is our sample, which
included only certain specialties and focused in particular on high-intensity
clinician-users. Because we largely excluded clinicians who had never tried the
HIE, we cannot explain why they did not even attempt use it. Finally, because
clinicians may not completely understand the factors that influence them, we
may have missed some factors or exaggerated others. These limitations
notwithstanding, the timeline for deciding the criteria of the meaningful use
payments may not allow for many further studies and it is therefore judicious to
begin considering policies to address HIE usage based on these early
experiences.
3.8 Conclusions
We found that at least some clinicians believed health information
exchange improved care and saved time, which motivated them to access the
HIE. However, their motivation was moderated by many factors, including the
amount of data in the HIE, how well they could integrate the HIE into their
workflow, and usability issues. The lack of clinical notes and absence of hospital
data limited the utility of the HIE for the community in important ways. Clinicians,
EHR and HIE vendors, and HIE trainers will need to work collaboratively to
effectively integrate HIE into clinical workflows. Meaningful-use payments can
create incentives for clinicians to contribute data into HIEs, but that will likely not
be enough to achieve the potential value of HIE, and complementary policies
should be considered that target HIE organizations and HIE and EHR vendor
companies. The goals of such complementary policies should be to make sure
that HIEs are being used, and that clinicians have help in adopting HIE
functionality so that they can more easily realize their benefits. Key aspects of
these policies will be to create incentives for HIE organizations - coupled with
regional extension centers - to provide assistance to clinicians in integrating HIE
into their workflows, and to motivate HIE organizations and vendor companies to
develop and report relevant metrics of usage so that efforts to foster HIE can be
held accountable.
Chapter 4 Care transitions as opportunities for HIE
usage
4.1 Abstract 2
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 will reward
providers for "meaningful use" of electronic health records, including
participation in clinical data exchange, but the best ways to do so remain
uncertain. We analyzed patient visits in one community in which a high
proportion of providers were using an electronic health record and participating
in data exchange. Using claims data from one large private payer, we computed
the number of care transitions between individual providers and medical groups
as a percentage of total visits. On average, excluding radiology and pathology,
approximately 51% of visits involved care transitions between individual
providers in the community and 36-41% of visits involved transitions between
medical groups. There was substantial variation in transition percentage across
medical specialties, within specialties and across medical groups. Specialists
tended to have higher transition percentages and smaller ranges within specialty
than primary care physicians who ranged from 32 to 95 percent (including
transitions involving radiology and pathology). Transition percentages of
pediatric practices were similar to adult primary care, except that many
transitions occurred among pediatric physicians within a single medical group.
Patient visit patterns should be considered in designing incentives to foster
providers' meaningful use of health data exchange services.
4.2 Introduction
In chapter 3, we suggest that policies should promote the measure of HIE
usage and pay providers or regional extension centers according to usage. To
support assessment of HIE usage, this chapter suggests a simple method of
computing the number of visits to a provider in which an aggregate patient
2 The contents of this chapter were published here: Care transitions as opportunities for clinicians to use
data exchange services: how often do they occur? Rudin RS, Salzberg CA, Szolovits P, Volk LA, Simon
SR, Bates DW. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2011 Apr 28
record would contain clinical data that the provider had not yet seen, based on
whether a visit involved a care transition as opposed to a repeat visit to the same
provider. We propose that some fraction of the number of visits which involve
care transitions may serve as a reasonable target for the number of times a
clinician might be expected to access an aggregate record HIE. This in turn could
be considered in the meaningful use criteria, or related policies, aimed at
fostering HIE. To better understand the nature of care transitions in which an
aggregate patient record may be used, we explored patient visit patterns in one
geographic community and compute descriptive statistics related to care
transitions in that community.
4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Data sources
We analyzed claims data for members of a large private payer in a small
community in New England, data which accounted for approximately 33% of all
visits in the community. [91] The community had an established HIE with most
of its medical groups participating. The data set included all claims, paid and
unpaid, for years 2005 through the first half of 2009, which were submitted to
the payer by providers who practiced within the six zip codes of the community,
as well as claims from providers outside the community that were ascribed to
any patient who had at least one claim from a community provider. Additionally,
the data set included certain demographic information describing members and
providers (but only providers within the community), current as of the end of the
study period.
4.3.2 Community providers
Providers were represented by unique provider identification numbers,
which were assigned to either individual clinicians or medical groups. We
assembled a list of all provider numbers whose addresses were within the
community's six zip codes and had at least one claim ascribed to them during the
study period. We included all community providers regardless of whether or not
they participated in the actual HIE. In most cases, the specialty and medical
group of the provider were supplied in the data. In addition, we used the name
and address of the medical group given in the data and internet searches to
determine or verify specialty and to assign to a medical group (e.g., one
physician was labeled "emergency medicine" but also had an office practice for
orthopedic surgery). We excluded anesthesiologists because they typically work
only with other physicians and would not require a separate data exchange. We
merged together any provider numbers that had the same identical names.
We excluded providers who had the fewest visits in the data set because
the results related to those providers were unstable. We selected a cutoff of less
than 300 visits during the four and a half year study period for excluding
providers and tested the sensitivity of the findings with the threshold at 200 and
400 visits. Providers may have had low visit volumes for a number of reasons
including, for example, that they worked part-time, they practiced in the
community for only a short while, or they primarily cared for older patients which
were not part of the data set.
4.3.3 Community patients
We included all patients enrolled in the health plan who had one or more
claims for visits to a community provider in the data set. We excluded patients
older than age 65 because many of those individuals may have also filed claims
through Medicare, and we had no access to those data. For the included patients,
we computed the age distribution and the gender ratio from members'
demographic information in the data set. To assess completeness of our data, for
each patient, we calculated their active time span in the data set by counting the
number of days between their earliest and latest claim and computed the
number of active patients at any given time over the course of the study period.
4.3.4 Individual visits
From the claims data, we extrapolated provider visits. Multiple claims that
contained the same date, provider and patient were considered part of the same
visit. We excluded all claims labeled as facilities fees and other claims that were
not labeled "professional." We included only claims assigned to individual
providers, though we did also test the sensitivity of our findings by including
claims assigned to medical groups. For inpatient claims, any claim submitted
between admit and discharge date was considered part of the inpatient visit.
Claims submitted on the same date as an emergency visit were considered part
of the emergency visit.
4.3.5 Care transitions
For the primary analyses, we estimated care transitions to providers based
on the visit patterns of each provider's patients. A visit was counted as a care
transition if the patient's preceding medical visit in the community was to a
different provider. We assumed that all community providers who were not
specifically excluded contributed clinical data, immediately following every
patient visit, to a hypothetical community-wide HIE and had access to the HIE's
aggregate patient records. For each care transition, therefore, medical data
would be available in the hypothetical HIE's aggregate record. Repeat visits to
the same provider without intervening visits to other community providers were
not counted as care transitions (Figure 4.1). This measure is similar to the
"sequence" metric used by researchers to estimate continuity of care. [92] If
more than one provider was visited by a patient on the same day, we ordered
the sequences of those visits to minimize care transitions (e.g. if a patient visited
providers A and B on the same day and then visited provider A again later that
week, we considered the visit order BAA rather than ABA). We defined the
transition percentage as the percentage of a provider's visits that involved care
transitions.
We computed these and related metrics under the following scenarios:
1) Individual clinicians. We computed the clinicians' transition percentage,
ignoring the clinicians' medical group membership. We computed average
transition percentages by medical specialty to allow comparisons across
specialties, and we also report variation within the specialties.
2) Medical groups. We computed transition percentages of medical groups. A
visit was counted as a care transition only if the patient's preceding visit in
the community was to a different medical group. We assumed providers
remained in the same groups throughout the study period.
We did not assign inpatient and ED visits to individual providers because
they tended to involve multiple clinicians and it was not clear which providers
would have been most likely to use the HIE for the visit. We combined inpatient
and ED visits into one category because there was only one hospital in the
community and the ED was attached to that hospital. For the group scenario, we
included inpatient and ED visits as part of the hospital.
Patient visit pattern to Provider A: No. Provider B: No. Provider C: No.
providers A, B and C of care of care of care
transitions/total transitions/total transitions/total
visits (transition visits (transition visits (transition
percentage) percentage) percentage)
Patient 1: 0/9 0/0 0/0
AAAAAAAAAA
Patient 2: 4/4 5/5 0/0
ABABABABAB
Patient 3: 0/4 1/5 0/0
AAAAABBBBB
Patient 4: 3/4 2/3 2/2
ABCAACABBA
Total for patients 1, 2, 3 7/21 (33%) 8/13 (62%) 2/2 (100%)
and 4 1 1
Figure 4.1: Example patient visit patterns with computed care transitions and transition percentages.
Transition percentage is defined as the percentage of a provider's total visits in which the patient's previous
visit was to a different provider. Each patient's first visit in the study period with any provider would not
count as part of their total visits for this provider because there was no way to determine if this first visit
involved a care transition.
For both individual clinician and medical group scenarios, we computed
the transition percentage for the community as a whole, and we tested the
sensitivity of these estimates when including only those clinical specialties which
we believed would be the primary users of an HIE ("core" specialties) and also
when excluding radiology and pathology. All groups in this community included
clinicians who were either core or non-core specialties, never both. We used only
claims assigned to individual clinicians, but also tested the sensitivity of the
results when including claims assigned to medical groups for the group scenario.
We also computed the percentage of visits to all community providers for which
the previous visit took place outside of the community.
We used SAS version 9.2, MATLAB version 7.8.0, and Excel 2003 to
perform these analyses.
4.4 Results
We found notable variation in transition percentage across specialty,
within specialty, and across medical groups even in this small community.
Primary care physicians had a transition percentage of 54%, while in comparison,
specialists tended to have higher percentages, averaging 79% for core
specialties. Among primary care physicians, pediatricians had similar transition
percentages compared to internists when considered as individual providers, but
a pediatric medical group showed only 24%, reflecting a higher number of
transitions internal to the group. Within specialties, primary care physicians
showed the greatest range of transition percentage, varying from 32% to 95%.
Medical groups had a wide range, and in particular the large group practice had
about half the transition percentage of several smaller practices. For the
community as a whole, excluding radiology and pathology, the transition
percentage was 51% for individual clinicians and 41% for medical groups.
4.4.1 Provider characteristics
We identified 226 provider numbers in the community with at least one
patient visit, 119 of which were assigned to unique individuals with more than
300 visits (Figure 4.2). Of those 119 providers, 80 were in core specialties
(Figure 4.3). A wide range of specialties was represented in the community,
including 34 providers that were considered to be primary care.
226 provider numbers (342,266 visits) in
community were assigned to at least one
patient visit during study period
Excluded 5 provider numbers
(2,568 visits) of anesthesiologists
and related to pharmacy Excluded 36 provider numbers
---- (28,234 visits) that were
Excluded 60 provider numbers (5,984 assigned to groups
visits) with less than 300 claims
Merged 6 duplicate-povde
numbersr
119 unique individual providers (305,480
visits) were identified, 80 of which (246,856
visits) were "core" specialties
47 groups were extrapolated,
23 of which contained only
"core" specialties
Individual Clinician Scenario Medical group scenario
Care transitions were computed for all Care transitions were computed
clinicians and for only core specialties for all groups and for groups
Ig containing only core specialties
Figure 4.2: Community providers included in the study
Providers in Core Specialties (N 80) Providers in Non-core Specialties (N=39)
Primary Care (34) Chiropractic(6)
Family Practice (5) Clinical Psychology(7)
Internal Medicine (18) Dentistry(8)
Nurse Practitioner (2) Dietician Nutritionist(1)
Pediatrics (9) Mental Health Counselor(3)
Specialties (46) Optometry(3)
Cardiovascular Disease (2) Physical Therapy(6)
Dermatology (3) Social Worker(5)
Gastroenterology (1)
General Surgery (2)
Hematology/Oncology (1)
Midwife (2)
Neurology (2)
Obstetrics and Gynecology (5)
Ophthalmology (4)
Oral & Maxillofacial Surgery (3)
Orthopedic Surgery (4)
Otolaryngology (1)
Pathology (4)
Podiatry (2)
Psychiatry (2)
Pulmonary Disease (1)
Radiology (5)
Urology (2)Psychology(7
Figure 4.3: Specialties of community providers
4.4.2 Patient characteristics
The sample included 18,831 patients who were younger than 65 years
and visited a community provider for more than one visit. Slightly more than half
of the patients (55%) were female and the average age was 36. The average
frequency of activity among patients was 826 days (median 832, IQR 269-1402)
of a total possible 1641 days. The mean number of visits per patient during the
study period was 19 (median 11, IQR 4-25).
4.4.3 Care transitions - individual community clinicians
We found notable variation in the transition percentage by clinical
specialty (Table 4.1). Radiologists and pathologists had the greatest transition
percentages, as may be expected, averaging greater than 95%. Providers with
low transition percentages included physical therapists and chiropractors with
22% and 25% of visits, respectively. Specialties with relatively high transition
percentages included ophthalmology and obstetrics/gynecology with transitions
occurring in 84% and 79% of visits on average, respectively. Primary care
specialties fell in the middle range, with 54%.
We found that the transition percentage also varied to some extent within
medical specialties. For example, internists and pediatricians showed notable
variation. Transition percentages for both of these specialties ranged more than
45 percentage points with a standard deviation (weighted by number of visits) of
greater than 10. Most specialties seemed more consistent, although there were
fewer practitioners of these specialties in the community. Obstetrics and
gynecology physicians ranged less than 20%, with 4 of 5 having transition
percentages within the range 79-85%. The orthopedic surgeons had transitions
of 71-74%.
Specialty No. No. Weighted average transition
clinicians visits percentage (weighted SD)
[low-high]
Primary Care
Family 5 16,569 44.3 (7.3) [32.4-67.6]
Practice
Internal 18 66,411 54.6 (10.3) [35.0-95.2]
Medicine
Nurse 2 783 91.0 [88.1-93.3]
Practitioner
Pediatrics 9 41,008 56.2 (11.1) [45.1-93.2]
All primary care 34 124,771 54.0(11.3)[32.4-95.2]
Core Specialties
Cardiovascular 2 2,220 81.4 [60.9-85.3]
Disease
Dermatology 3 9,862 59.3[49.7-62.5]
Gastroenterology 1 4,517 68.4
General Surgery 2 2,551 78.1[77.4-82.9]
Hematology/ 1 2,009 50.9
Oncology
Midwife 2 783 91.1[88.1-93.3]
Neurology 2 4,430 61.7[58.1-80.4]
Obstetrics and 5 13,972 79.3(6.9) [65.0-84.1]
Gynecology
Ophthalmology 4 6,166 83.9[79.2-87.3]
Oral & Maxillofacial 3 2,035 57.5[51.9-70.1]
Surgery
Orthopedic surgery 4 10,051 71.6[70.8-73.7]
Otolaryngology 1 740 73.9
Pathology 4 5,938 98.7[98.7-99.0]
Podiatry 2 2,725 71.5[55.4-77.4]
Psychiatry 2 2,219 47.2[36.5-49.1]
Pulmonary Disease 1 665 87.4
Radiology 5 29,524 95.2(0.9) [94.2-97.6]
Urology 2 2,571 72.1[68.1-75.4]
Non-core Specialties
Chiropractic 6 12,165 25.3(9.1)[12.1-47.0]
Clinical 7 3,573 32.2(14.3)[7.4-57.5]
Psychology
Dentistry 8 12,861 59.3(5.1) [51.3-70.9]
Dietician 1 357 82.6
Nutritionist
Mental Health 2* 2,039 23.9[9.3-23.7]
Counselor
Optometry 2* 5,885 87.4[85.5-89.0]
Physical Therapy 6 16,570 22.1(2.7)[19.1-28.4]
Social Worker 5 2,282 31.9(4.6)[27.4-40.1]
Table 4.1: Transition percentages for individual clinicians, grouped by specialty.
Averages of each specialty are weighted by visit totals and so are equivalent to the portion of total visits to
clinicians in each particular specialty that are care transitions. Standard deviations are also weighted by
total visits and are computed as the square root of the weighted unbiased variance. We only report standard
deviations for specialties for which the data contains five or more providers, and high/low for two or more.
The number of visits excludes patients' first visits in the data set.
*One mental health counselor and one optometrist showed zero care transitions and, as such, were
considered outliers and excluded.
4.4.4 Care transitions - medical group scenario
We also found notable variation in transition percentage among medical
groups (Table 4.2). The hospital had the greatest transition percentage in the
community, because of the radiologists and pathologists practicing there. Several
group practices were single-specialty and had transition percentages similar to
what the same type of specialists had in the individual scenario. The pediatric
practice, however, showed a transition percentage of 24%, which was
considerably less than any pediatrician's percentage in the individual scenario,
indicating a large number of transitions within the group. The community's
largest group also had a smaller transition percentage compared with most other
practices.
Medical group No. of Specialties Transition
description Clinicians represented in group percentage (of
total visits)
Group 1: Hospital 8* Radiology (2), 86.4% (of
Pathology (4), Internal 18,403)+
Medicine(l),
Otolaryngology(1)
Group 2: Large group 21 Multiple specialties++ 36.8% (of 75,246)
practice
Group 3: Medium-size 6 Cardiology(2), 70.8% (of 10,343)
group practice Urology(2), Obstetrics/
Gynecology(2)
Group 4: Medium-size 4 Orthopedic surgery 69.5% (of 9,993)
group practice
Group 5: Medium-size 5 Internal medicine 41.2% (of 14,248)
group practice
Group 6: Medium-size 5 Pediatrics 23.9% (of 20,890)
group practice
Group 7: Medium-size 4 Ophthalmology 81.7% (of 6,164)
group practice
Group 8: Medium-size 6 Family practice(3), 62.2% (of 14,039)
group practice Nurse Practitioner(l),
Obstetrics/
Gynecology (2)
Group 9: Medium-size 5 Physical Therapy 20.1% (of 14,542)
group practice
Group 10: Small group 1 Family Practice 43.1% (of 8,725)
practice
Table 4.2: Care transitions between medical groups.
Only groups with greater than 6000 visits in data set are shown (except for one radiology group which is
not shown). Care transitions between providers within the same group are not counted in the transition
percentages.
* Clinicians who treat patients for inpatient and ED visits are not counted in the number of clinicians.
+ The hospital's transition percentage includes inpatient and ED visits. If these visits are excluded, the
transition percentage is slightly higher, 88.5%. Most hospital visits are for radiology or pathology.
++ This group included: general surgery (2), internal medicine (11), nurse practitioner (1), neurology (1),
obstetrics and gynecology (1), pediatrics (3), pulmonary disease (1), podiatry (1).
4.4.5 Community results
For the community in total, we found that the overall transition
percentage ranged between 36% and 62% depending on various assumptions
(Table 4.3). When providers are considered in their medical groups, their
transition percentages are as much as 15% lower than when they are considered
as individuals, because of care transitions that occur internal to medical groups.
Transition percentages among core specialties were similar to transition
percentages among all provider types. When radiology and pathology visits were
removed, the community transition percentage decreased by approximately 10%.
We performed several sensitivity tests on these results and found the
results to be reasonably robust. Removing inpatient and ED visits from the group
scenario resulted in negligible change in the community transition percentage,
reflecting the fact that these types of visits represented a small portion of the
total community visits. We changed the provider exclusion threshold to 200 visits
and 400 visits, which involved adding 3,211 visits and excluding 4,448 visits
respectively, for the individual provider scenario. We found negligible changes in
transition percentages from these changes. We included 28,234 visits which
were assigned to medical groups in the group scenario for all clinicians. The total
community transition percentage rose from 50% to 52% as a result of the group
claims with most groups having only one or two percentage changes and the
largest change happening in the pediatric practice which showed a 4% increase
in transition percentage from 24% to 28%.
Even though we did not have complete knowledge of the clinicians who
worked outside of the community, we did estimate the total proportion of
community visits which involved transitions from outside of the community, and
assessed this proportion to be 14.5% of all visits to community providers. The
data allowed us to calculate this because it included visits by patients to
providers outside of the community. If a patient had visited a non-community
provider before a visit to a community provider, we counted the visit to the
community provider as a visit that involved a transition from outside of the
community.
Scenario Transition percentages (of Transition percentages (of
patient visits) patient visits), excluding
radiology and pathology
Individual clinician: 60.2% (of 283,613) 51.2% (of 247,105)
all providers
Individual clinician: 62.2% (of 226,381) 51.5% (of 190,015)
core specialties only
Medical group: 50.2 % (of 284,597) 40.6% (of 247,793)
all providers
Medical group: 48.8% (of 226,346) 35.7% (of 189,929)
core specialties only I
Table 4.3 Community care transitions per patient visit.
Inpatient and emergency visits were included in group scenarios and excluded from the individual
scenarios. Differences in visits between individual and group scenarios are because we consider same day
visits to the same group as part of the same visit in the group scenario.
4.5 Discussion
We found that transitions in care represented a substantial proportion of
patient visits in one community. These visits represent opportunities for an
aggregate patient record form of HIE to provide useful information. We also
found a notable range of transition percentages across specialties, within
specialties and across medical groups even among the modest number of
clinicians in the data set.
We identified a few other studies that computed the frequency of care
transitions for patients in a community, although most involved less broad clinical
samples. For example, one study that investigated the frequency with which an
HIE was accessed was restricted to emergency departments. [66] Another study
evaluated the number of patients who visited more than one ED within a
geographic region. [64] A study of the United Kingdom's effort to share clinical
records was also restricted to emergency or unscheduled care settings.[93]
Other studies that report HIE usage numbers did not focus on appropriate levels
of usage based on patient visit patterns. [62]
4.6 Policy implications
If variation in transition percentage among clinicians is common in many
communities, meaningful use payments and related policy incentives should
consider patient visit patterns, in addition to visit volumes, in estimates of target
HIE usage.
Many providers may not access an aggregate record HIE for every care
transition for good reasons. Some patients' problems may be routine and data in
the HIE may be unrelated to the patient's current problem or clinical episode.
However, providers will often not be able to determine the relevance of the data
without first reviewing them. We suggest that if providers - primary care
especially - are to be responsible for coordination of patient care and
comprehensive treatment of medical conditions, some fraction of the number of
care transitions a provider encounters will represent a reasonable meaningful use
target for a provider accessing an aggregate patient record HIE. What that
fraction is should be addressed empirically. Which specific data types providers
should be expected to view also represents an open question and likely varies by
clinicians' specialty and the setting in which they are seeing the patient, as well
as the specific circumstances of the patient's visit. In many clinical scenarios,
providers may be expected to check for recent laboratory results, changes in
problem lists and medications, or consultation notes.
Some providers may access an HIE even for repeat visits because
information from the HIE had not been imported into the provider's EHR during
the previous visit, or because the provider had no way of knowing whether or
not new data was present in the HIE. HIE vendors may reduce the need for
these accesses, which may be a burden on the provider, by providing
functionality that allows automatic importing of HIE data into an EHR and by
implementing a visual cue that indicates whether or not new data exists in the
HIE as of the patients' previous visit.
In addition to assessing HIE accesses, meaningful use payments might
also consider including accesses to medical groups' EHRs for care transitions that
are internal to medical groups, which accounted for 10-15% of visits in the
community we studied and may be more or less in other communities, although
data exchange is much easier within a group that shares an EHR. This may be
especially important for large medical groups in which many patients receive
most of their care, because many care transitions will likely occur between
providers within those groups and incentives may be needed to ensure care
within the group is coordinated. [94]
If measures of HIE accesses are to be used as part of incentive payments,
HIE and EHR vendor companies must offer the capability to report these metrics.
It is unlikely that vendors will develop functionalities to report metrics that can
be compared across HIEs without some change in the incentives they face. We
recommend that vendors should be required to support these metrics as a
condition of certification. [95] Vendors would likely be able to compute counts of
actual HIE accesses as well as the volume of care transitions from data they
already capture in audit trails, although they should not be expected to develop
their own algorithms for doing this-development of a single algorithm might be
helpful and also could diminish the risk of "gaming."
Gaming does represent a serious concern; in particular, direct incentives
to providers simply for HIE accesses may not be a judicious approach to whether
or not meaningful use is present. [96] The risk of gaming should be studied
empirically. In addition to assessing providers' usage, care transition metrics may
be used to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of HIE organizations and
regional extension centers in engaging clinical users. One option might be to
incent HIEs in particular to have higher physician participation rates. We have
observed in evaluating a working HIE that the doctors could have benefitted
from some follow-up regarding how the HIE worked, more specifically simple
training in the office might have showed them the benefits, but the HIE did not
have an incentive to provide such training. [97]
4.7 Limitations
This study has several important limitations. The study focused on only
one small community and may not generalize to other care settings. Visit
patterns may be different in different kinds of communities, such as urban
settings, and may have more or less variation in transition percentage. In
addition, our claims data were limited to the claims submitted to one private
payer, the results may not be generalizable to other payers. Also, visits from
patients older than 65 years or from patients or providers not covered by the
payer were not included. In addition, we may have included claims that did not
occur in the community and excluded claims that did occur in the community
because of providers who practiced medicine in other regions under the same
provider number. We also did not account for providers who changed medical
groups during the study period. We may have missed a few care transitions that
occur on the same day as an ED visits or inpatient admission or discharge. Finally,
we assumed that the aggregate record in the hypothetical community-wide HIE
had comprehensive, up-to-date data from all providers in the community under
each scenario, which may be difficult to achieve for many HIEs in the near
future.[97] Realistic usage targets will therefore likely be lower than the
estimates in this study but will still be computable from the patient visit patterns
of providers who participate in HIEs.
4.8 Conclusion
In this study within one community, we found that a substantial
percentage of patient visits involved care transitions. This finding supports
previous studies that identified significant potential use for HIE, especially for
aggregate patient records. We also found notable variation in the proportion of
visits that involved care transitions across providers and provider types in this
community, which suggests that patient visit patterns should be considered in
designing incentives to foster providers' meaningful use of health data exchange
functionality.
Chapter 5 Impact of mergers of medical groups and
variation in provider participation on the potential
value of regional health information exchanges: a
simulation of 10 communities
5.1 Abstract
Substantial resources are being invested in establishing health information
exchanges (HIE). However, under pressure to form accountable care
organizations, medical groups may merge, limiting the need to exchange data
through external HIEs. Our simulations of 10 communities suggest that
considerable consolidation of medical groups would have to occur to substantially
reduce an HIE's value. However, our simulations also suggest that to be
successful HIEs will have to recruit a large portion of the medical groups in a
community. Hospitals and large groups will be key participants, but they alone
may only cover 10-20% of total care transitions in communities.
5.2 Introduction
As discussed in prior chapters, health information exchange may be on
the verge of a major expansion. More than one hundred organizations are
operating or launching health information exchanges (HIEs) to enable the
exchange of data between independent healthcare organizations. [19]
Widespread HIE has the potential to create substantial clinical and financial
benefits as a return on the current investment of hundreds of millions of federal
and state dollars.[14] While initial HIE efforts have focused on the exchange of
laboratory results, federal incentive programs are intended to spur many more
HIEs to pursue more advanced forms of data exchange. These advanced
capabilities include aggregate patient records - longitudinal medical records that
are indexed by patients and consist of clinical data from multiple providers in a
community. [19] [98] [99] [30] [62] [Rudin - ACI] Aggregate patient records
represent a major federal priority. Although not yet completely specified, the
federal incentive program for "meaningful use" of health information technology
is expected to give payments to eligible providers for "access to comprehensive
patient records," which may include use of aggregate patient records. [46] [47]
However, the potential value of community HIEs may diminish
significantly if medical groups consolidate into larger organizations through
mergers of medical groups or if hospitals and medical groups integrate into
entities such as accountable care organizations. If two or more medical groups
merge and adopt a shared electronic health record, data exchanges within the
merged group could be executed internally, bypassing the HIE and reducing the
HIEs' potential value for many care transitions.[100] A wave of medical group
mergers is already underway as hospitals and other entities are purchasing
practices. Independent physicians may be moving toward employed status at a
high rate. [94] [101] Accountable care organizations (ACO) may accelerate this
trend, diminishing the number of opportunities for community medical groups to
exchange data through an HIE.
Even if only few mergers occur, most HIEs will face another problem:
recruiting and retaining medical groups. Like a telephone exchange, an HIE is
only as good as its participating membership. Inadequate participation of
community healthcare providers is one important threat to success for regional
HIE organizations. [Rudin - ACI] Providers might decline to join an HIE for many
reasons such as competition for patients, technical challenges, privacy and
security concerns, legal issues, HIE-related fees, the lack of a business case, and
they may not believe an HIE will have much of the information they need. [40]
[41] [31] If few providers in a community contribute data to an HIE, the number
of opportunities to use the HIE for improving patients' coordination and
continuity of care will be greatly reduced and the HIE's potential value will be
diminished.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how these two phenomena
could affect the value of a community HIE as a provider of aggregate patient
records: "mergers of medical groups" and "provider participation in the HIE." To
estimate the impact, we examined the proportion of relevant care transitions that
would be served by an HIE under various simulated scenarios. A variety of
policies and economic changes are currently influencing both the degree to
which medical groups are merging and the likelihood of provider participation in
community HIEs. [102] Because of this, we simulated how the potential for
exchange of data would be altered under a selected set of illustrative scenarios
of medical group mergers and provider participation in community-wide HIEs
using data from one commercial health plan including all professional claims for
provider visits in ten communities.
5.3 Methods
5.3.1 Overview
To measure the potential value of an HIE, we defined a care transition as
a sequential pair of patient encounters with different provider groups in a
community. We assumed that a community-wide HIE could be used to transmit
clinical data among these pairs of groups. We did not consider care transitions
which involved sequential visits to providers in same group because data
exchanges for those transitions could be done using the medical group's EHR
and would not involve an HIE. To develop constructs of medical group mergers
and provider participation and to investigate their impact on the potential value
of community HIEs, we analyzed ten geographic communities which were either
actively building an HIE or had applied within the past few years to receive a
large grant for constructing a community-wide HIE. For each of these
communities, we simulated various scenarios of medical group mergers and
provider participation (described below).
5.3.2 Data sources
We used the same data set as in chapter 4: administrative claims data for
members of a large private payer in 10 geographical communities in
Massachusetts. We divided the data set into three 18-month periods to test for
consistency of the results and for each study period we only included patients
enrolled for the duration of the study period. The data set also included certain
demographic information about the providers from the end of the last study
period, which we used to assign providers to medical groups (Appendix 1.) We
performed the entire analysis including all clinical specialties and also performed
a separate analysis for only "core" provider specialties, those in which the
providers were likely to be frequent HIE users. This core group included most
physician specialties and nurses. We excluded radiologists and pathologists from
the core specialties because those providers tend to have high volumes of care
transitions which would dominate the simulation results and interfere with closer
examination of data exchanges among the other specialties. (See appendix 1 for
a complete list of specialties considered core and non-core.)
5.3.3 Measuring care transitions
We used the same method described in chapter 4 to identify provider
visits and clean the data. Appendix 1 contains the methodological details that
differ from chapter 4. Notably, in this chapter, we did not group providers based
on their group name, only their address and a few other factors as explained in
appendix 1. Also as with chapter 4, a care transition was identified based on the
sequence of provider visits and was counted if the patient's preceding medical
visit was to a different medical group (Figure 5.1).
To estimate potential value of the HIE, we computed the total number of
patients' care transitions between the medical groups which were assumed to be
participating in the community HIE under each simulated scenario. For each of
the ten communities, we computed the baseline number of care transitions by
assuming that all included medical groups participated in their community HIE
and none of them had merged. The specific simulation patterns generated for
both medical group mergers and for provider participation are described below.
One patient's visit sequence Baseline no. of care No. care transitions No. care transitions
to medical groups A, B and C transitions covered by HIE if covered by HIE if
groups A and B group C was not
merged participating
AAAAAAAAAA 0 0 0
ABABABABAB 9 0 9
AAAAABBBBB 1 0 1
ABCAACABBA 7 4 4
Figure 5.1 Example patient visit sequences
Example patient visit sequences and corresponding number of care transitions covered by an HIE.
Care transitions are opportunities for participating providers to access new data in the aggregate patient
records of a community HIE.
5.3.4 Simulations
We performed two simulations which generated scenarios of medical
group mergers and two more simulations which generated scenarios that varied
provider participation.
(Si) Large mergers. This simulation shows the cumulative impact of
mergers of medical groups. After computing the baseline number of care
transitions that occurred in one study period assuming full participation by
community medical groups, this simulation then computes the number of care
transitions that would be covered by the HIE if the two groups that share the
most care transitions between them had merged. A merger of these two groups
would reduce the number of care transitions covered by the HIE more than any
other merger. The simulation then repeats until all of the groups have merged
into one community-wide group with zero care transitions. By selecting the
mergers involved in the most care transitions, this simulation examines the
cumulative effect of larger mergers on the value of an HIE.
(S2) Small mergers. This simulation is the same as S1 except that the
merged groups are selected by taking the group with the smallest number of
visits in the data set and merging it with the group with which it shares the
largest number of their care transitions. Like S1, the simulation repeats until all
groups merge into one community-wide group. It can be understood as the
converse of S1 in that it examines the cumulative effect of smaller mergers on
the value of an HIE.
(S3) Recruitment. This simulation shows how the value of an HIE grows
with increasing participation of medical groups. Starting with only one group
participating, the initial value of an HIE in this simulation is always zero. With
each additional group, the number of care transitions covered by the HIE
increases. This simulation begins with the medical group that is involved in the
most care transitions in the community and iteratively adds the group involved in
the next most volume of care transitions until it reaches the baseline case of all
groups participating. It therefore reflects one extreme case of how HIEs may
recruit medical groups.
(S4) Retention. This simulation is the opposite of S3. It begins with the
baseline case of full community participation and then simulates the non-
participation of only the group that is involved in the most care transitions in the
community. Using the same sequence of groups as S3, it then iteratively
simulates the non-participation of the group involved in the next most volume of
care transitions until none of the groups are remaining. This simulation illustrates
how important it would be to retain the groups that have the most potential
value to an HIE. It is analogous to a targeted attack on a network in which the
nodes that would reduce the network's value by the greatest degree are attacked
and removed from the network. [103]
For each simulation, we only varied either the group structure (for S1 and
S2) or which groups participated in the HIE (S3 and S4). The time period was
kept constant for every scenario within each simulation. Holding the simulation
time periods constant allows an examination of the effect of our two phenomena
on HIE value, but does not represent realistic merging and recruitment events
which would occur over time.
We performed the four simulations on the claims data for each of the ten
communities, separately for core providers and for all providers, and for each of
the three study periods. We executed the simulations using MATLAB version
7.9.0 (R2009b) on the high performance computing cluster at Partners Health
Care in Boston.
5.3.5 Analysis
For each community, we computed the number of study patients, total
visits, visits per patient, and number of medical groups. We also computed the
transition percentage - defined as the portion of visits for which the previous
visit in the community was to a different medical group.[100] To calculate
market concentration, we used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which
ranges from near 0 (many small firms) to 1 (only one large firm). The HHI is
computed by squaring the market share of each group in the community and
then summing the resulting numbers. To represent the market share of each
group, we used the number of patient visits to that group during the study
period.
For each simulation, we computed specific metrics that summarize the
results. For all community characteristics and simulation metrics, we computed
the median and range across the communities, how they differed across the
three study periods, and between core specialties compared with all specialties.
We normalized the results based on the number of medical groups in each
community, which we calculated as the number of groups that would account for
99% of community care transitions. This excluded the smallest groups because
they would not have much of an impact on the value of the HIE.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Community characteristics
The communities showed a wide range along several dimensions (Table 1).
There was a five-fold variation in the number of study patients per community,
and an eight-fold variation in the number of medical groups per community. The
number of visits per patient to core providers ranged between 3.6 and 6.1. The
transition percentage - defined as the portion of visits for which the previous
visit in the community was to a different medical group - also varied
substantially across the study communities, 29.8-50.1% for core providers. We
found that the market concentration of visits differed by a factor of more than 6
on the Herfindahl-Hirschhorn Index (HHI) among the communities for core
specialties, and the community with the fewest patients (community number 10
table 5.2) was also the most concentrated by a substantial degree.
Community2 No. patients
51,434
19,436
46,911
20,538
49,040
56,799
40,001
17,896
16,740
9,856
30,269.5[9,856-
56,799]
No. visits3 Visits/patient
295,460
88,470
191,828
126,028
217,304
225,887
144,048
70,856
75,678
54,395
135,038.[54,395-
295,460]
5.74
4.55
4.09
6.14
4.43
3.98
3.60
3.96
4.52
5.52
4.48[3.60-
6.14]
No. transitions
138,114
29,817
70,662
63,139
76,680
81,857
45,273
30,783
22,532
23,596
54,206.[22,532-
138,114]
Transition
percentage4
46.75%
33.70%
36.84%
50.10%
35.29%
36.24%
31.43%
43.44%
29.77%
43.38%
36.54%[29.77%-
50.10%]
HHI
0.0225
0.0329
0.0372
0.0394
0.0401
0.0405
0.0409
0.0453
0.0715
0.1421
0.0403[0.0225-
0.1421]
Table 5.1 Community characteristics (core specialties only).1
1. Includes visits to core specialties from patients who were fully enrolled with one private payer from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2006.
2. Communities are presented here in order of increasing Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
3. Excludes each patient's initial visit in the study period because there is no way to determine if that visit involved a care transition.
4. Transition percentage is defined as the percent of total visits to community providers for which the patient's previous visit was to a different medical group in
the community.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
median[min-
max]
No.
groups
182
72
107
62
101
105
76
38
34
22
74[22-
182]
5.4.2 Simulation results
The ten communities we studied showed modest variation in potential
value under the simulation scenarios we used (Table 5.2). We present the results
for core specialties in period 1. (See appendix 2 for sensitivity analysis with all
specialties and across three study periods.)
In all communities, S1 results show that the potential value of HIE could
withstand considerable merging: the number of groups could reduce by 20-36%
through the most high-impact mergers (via 6-41 mergers) before potential value
was reduced below 50%, for core specialties (Table 5.2). Under the pattern of
consolidation simulated in S2 in which smaller groups merged into larger ones,
as long as there were between 4 and 9 groups remaining (3-13% of the number
of original groups), an HIE would still have 50% of its potential value (Figure
5.3).
The simulation of provider recruitment in S3 showed that a substantial
number of groups would need to be recruited for an HIE to have a substantial
value: a median of 18.5 groups (range 6-35) which consisted of 18-36% of total
community medical groups would need to participate to achieve 50% of the
HIE's potential value. Conversely, S4 shows that if the HIE cannot retain only a
relatively small number of key groups, 2-10 groups which consist of 5-13% of
the total community medical groups, the value of the HIE would be limited to
50% of its potential.
If these 2-10 key groups were the only groups recruited, S3 shows that
they would only realize 10-20% of the HIEs' potential value (Table 5.3). The
communities would have to recruit approximately 2 and 4 times the number of
these key groups to achieve 50% of their potential value (Table 5.2).
S2 S3
No. big
mergers
which
would
reduce
potential
HIE usage
by >
50%3
41
24
25
17
23
22
18
14
13
6
No.
consolidated
groups
needed for
potential
HIE to be >
30%4
4
4
4
2
4
3
6
4
3
2
74[22-182] 9.5[2-18] 20.[6-41] 4.[2-6]
No.
consolidated
groups
needed for
potential
HIE to be >
50%4
7
9
7
4
7
5
8
7
6
4
7.[4-9]
No. groups
needed to
participate
to achieve
15%
potential
HIE
usage5,6
8
7
7
5
6
6
6
6
5
2
No. groups
needed to
participate
to achieve
50%
potential
HIE
usage5,6
35
23
23
15
22
20
17
13
13
6
6.[2-8] 18.5[6-35]
No. big
mergers
which
would
reduce
potential
HIE usage
by >
25%3
18
12
12
8
10
10
9
8
7
2
Reduction in
potential HIE
usage from
absence of 5
groups5,6
34.27%
46.51%
41.32%
52.51%
43.09%
46.60%
50.81%
51.70%
62.36%
82.35%
48.70%[34.27%-
82.35%]
Table 5.2 Summary results (core specialties only from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2006)
1. Communities are presented here in order of increasing Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
2. No. groups are those that constitute 99% of community care transitions.
3. The sequence of mergers was decreasing by number care transitions between the pairs of medical groups in each geographic community.
4. Consolidation was simulated by iteratively merging groups that had the smallest visit volumes into the groups with which they shared the most care transitions.
5. The sequence of the groups is decreasing by volume of care transitions in each geographic community.
6. The denominator for these percentages is the potential HIE usage for the study period in each community assuming complete participation and no mergers i.e.
the total number of care transitions between groups during the study period.
Reduction in
potential HIE
usage from
absence of 2
groups5,6
17.66%
28.01%
23.37%
29.43%
25.41%
25.12%
27.92%
30.12%
37.12%
63.52%
27.97%[17.66%-
63.52%]
No.
groups2
182
72
107
62
101
105
76
38
34
22
Community1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
median[min-
max]
No.
group
absences
which
would
reduce
potential
HIE
usage
by >
50%5,6
10
7
8
5
7
6
5
5
3
2
5.5[2-
10]
Figure 5.2 Larger mergers (SI)
This pattern simulates the effect of mergers of medical groups on the potential value of community HIEs. Groups are chosen to merge based on the pairs of
groups with the most care transitions between them and so the first merger has the largest effect. The data include only core specialties and patient visits from
January 1st 2005 through June 30th 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does not represent time.
Every data point simulates all patient visits for the entire the study period.)
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Figure 5.3 Small mergers (S2)
This pattern simulates the effect of mergers of medical groups on the potential value of community HIEs. Groups with the smallest visit volumes are chosen to
merge with the group with whom they share the most care transitions and so the first mergers tend to have small effects. The data include only core specialties
and patient visits from January 1 2005 through June 30th 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does
not represent time. Every data point simulates all patient visits for the entire the study period.)
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Figure 5.4 Recruitment (S3)
This pattern simulates the effect of medical group participation in community HIEs on the potential value of the HIEs beginning with one group participating.
The sequence of groups is determined by decreasing volume of care transitions in each community. The data include only core specialties and patient visits from
January 1st 2005 through June 30h 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does not represent time.
Every data point simulates all patient visits for the entire the study period.)
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Figure 5.5 Retention (S4)
This pattern simulates the effect of the absence of medical groups from community HIEs on the potential value of the HIEs beginning with full participation. The
sequence of groups is determined by decreasing volume of care transitions in each community and so the first group has the largest effect. The data include only
core specialties and patient visits from January 1" 2005 through June 30*' 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group
mergers, and does not represent time. Every data point simulates all patient visits for the entire the study period.)
Community No. keygroups1
Percent of total groups
that are key groups2
5.49%
9.72%
7.48%
4 5 8.06%
5 7 6.93%
6 6 5.71%
7 5 6.58%
8 5 13.16%
9 3 8.82%
10 2 9.09%
median[min-
max] 5.5[2-10] 7.77%[5.49%-13.16%]
Table 5.3 Key medical groups (core specialties only).
Key group descriptions3
Hospital, Multispecialty, Multispecialty,
Dermatology, Orthopedic Surgery,
Multispecialty, Multispecialty, Primary care &
Pediatrics, Hospital, Otolaryngology
Hospital, Primary care, Multispecialty, Primary
care, Cardiovascular Disease, Primary care,
Pediatrics
Hospital, Multispecialty, Multispecialty,
Orthopedic surgery, Obstetrics & Gynecology,
Pediatrics, Primary care, Orthopedic Surgery
Hospital, Primary care, Primary care,
Ophthalmology, Obstetrics & Gynecology
Multispecialty, Hospital, Primary care, Hospital,
Multispecialty, Primary care, Primary care
Multispecialty, Hospital, Multispecialty,
Multispecialty, Primary care, Orthopedic Surgery
Hospital, Dermatology, Multispecialty,
Orthopedic Surgery, Multispecialty
Hospital, Primary care & Pediatrics, Primary
care, Primary care, Orthopedic Surgery
Multispecialty, Hospital, Multispecialty
Multispecialty, Hospital
N/A
HIE value with
key groups only
(S3)
19.71%
16.63%
20.16%
18.54%
17.75%
15.11%
13.11%
13.85%
10.67%
20.85%
17.19%[10.67%-
20.85%]
Decrease in potential
value of HIE if key
groups do not
participate (S4)4
50.42%
53.35%
53.02%
52.51%
53.61%
51.00%
50.81%
51.70%
50.36%
63.52%
52.11%[50.36%-
63.52%]
1. Key groups are those involved in the most care transitions in the community and would limit HIE value to <50% of potential if they did not participate.
2. Total groups are those that constitute 99% of community care transitions.
3. The group descriptions are ordered from those involved in the most community care transitions to the least.
4. Assumes all non-key groups participate in HIE
5.5 Discussion
We simulated the impact of medical group mergers and provider
participation in the HIEs on the potential value of HIEs in ten geographical
communities. Our results suggest that, for at least certain patient populations
younger than age 65, a limited number of mergers may not threaten the value
proposition of community HIEs, except for communities which are highly
concentrated. Furthermore, considerable consolidation of smaller providers may
occur before an HIE's value proposition is substantially diminished. However, our
results also suggest that participation by hospitals and other key medical groups,
while important, may not be sufficient for HIEs to achieve their potential value in
regional communities. These key providers may be involved in more care
transitions with other medical groups in the community than with one another.
Few other studies examine the potential value of HIE by investigating
patient visit patterns and those that do to date have mainly been limited to
emergency or acute care facilities.[68] [64] [79] Other studies have investigated
care fragmentation by counting the number of different providers that patients
visit in a given year and how providers are linked to other providers via shared
patients. [2] [104] [3] However, these studies do not consider care transitions,
which is important for estimating potential HIE usage.
Even though all ten communities were located in one state, the
communities' characteristics differed notably, suggesting they may be represent
at least some of the diversity that may be found in other parts of the U.S. For
example, the number of visits per patient ranged from 3.6 to 6.1. This may
reflect differences in patient visit patterns and crossover with providers in
neighboring communities. Also, the transition percentage ranged 28.9-50.1%
across the communities. This notably range might reflect differences in group
structure, provider specialties, patient visit patterns, or differences in other
patient or provider characteristics among the communities. The HHI of market
concentration also showed a wide range.
The findings in this study may be relevant to some of the key issues
facing HIEs today, including working with accountable care organizations,
recruiting a critical mass of providers, and paying for HIE services.
5.5.1 Accountable care organizations
Accountable care organizations (ACO) may be important clients for many
HIEs. [102] [105] [106] How ACOs and HIEs will be structured is unknown:
some communities may have one community-wide ACO whose members all
participate in the same community-wide HIE; other communities will likely have
multiple ACOs which share the same HIE; [84] and others may involve more
complex arrangements in which individual medical groups participate in multiple
ACOs or multiple HIEs. Regardless, ACOs and HIEs will need to work together to
achieve their goals of improving care quality and reducing cost.
ACOs and HIEs with high rates of "leakage" or "crossover" of patient visits
with neighboring communities may have difficulty determining which collection of
medical groups would optimize their ability to measure quality or to maximize
HIE value. Simulations or research into "community detection algorithms" may
yield insight for this problem. [107] Because regulations will not restrict Medicare
patients from seeking care outside of an ACO, patient crossover may not be
reduced in the near future. [105] However, there may be significant advantages
for patients if they stay within the same HIE or ACO, such as improved
coordination of care, more effective use of automated decision support tools,
better measurements of provider quality, and more familiarity with their
providers. HIEs, ACOs, and policymakers may want to begin considering how to
motivate patients to stay within their participating medical groups, perhaps
through tiered copayments. [108]
However, there will likely always be a need for ACOs or HIEs to share data
with external providers. Yet, communities in which one ACO and one HIE
dominate may attempt to "lock in" patients by electing to restrict electronic
exchange of clinical information to only those providers within their organization,
even if many patients receive care externally. This may be especially true for
early stage ACOs which are still paid primarily using a fee-for-service model and
because they will still profit from having more patient encounters. Policies must
ensure that ACOs share data with other ACOs as appropriate. This may be less of
a concern for later stage ACOs that are paid more based on quality measures
and, therefore, have an incentive to share data if it would improve care quality.
ACOs may increase the likelihood that medical groups will merge, and
adopt the same EHRs, because of a decrease in antitrust restrictions and
because larger groups may be more efficient in delivering higher quality care.
[109] While our study shows that an HIE may still be important even if there are
many mergers, ACOs may create incentives for enough mergers in some
communities to put into question the value of an HIE. On the other hand, some
providers may want to have control of their patients' data should they decided to
leave an ACO, and a merger in which providers adopt the same EHR would not
allow that kind of flexibility.[84] It is therefore unknown at this point if medical
groups will merge and adopt shared EHRs on a scale that would pose a
substantial threat to the value proposition of HIEs.
5.5.2 Critical mass of providers
Many HIEs begin with only a few large hospitals and large provider groups.
[30] [31] [79] [81] Small practices have been slow to participate. [37] Our
results suggest that hospitals and other key medical groups are important to
HIEs, but despite this they may not constitute a critical mass for many
communities. Therefore, HIEs will need to recruit many smaller providers to
realize most of their potential value. [97]
More concentrated communities generally had fewer key medical groups.
Potential HIE usage for the most concentrated community was greatly affected
by the participation of only two groups: the hospital and one branch of a large
multispecialty group. In communities in which patient visits are concentrated in
relatively few medical groups, a few mergers could reduce potential value
substantially; whereas in the more diffuse communities, a much larger number of
mergers would need to happen to have the same proportional effect. However,
there may be exceptions to these tendencies if, say, communities with relatively
diffuse market concentrations had high volumes of care transitions among a
smaller number of groups.
To encourage participation, incentives and workflow interventions may
need to be customized to different kinds of providers. Hospitals and larger
groups may be more worried about sharing data with competitors, and may
therefore be a particularly good target for either strong incentives and/or close
monitoring that data are actually being contributed. [40] [41] The barriers for
smaller groups, by contrast, may relate to different factors such as lack of
technical expertise and these groups may need considerable technical support.
[110] Many medical groups will likely require training in how to integrate the HIE
into their workflows. [35] The meaningful use payments may help accelerate HIE
adoption for many medical groups, but they may be more effective for some
types of groups than others. Further research is needed to understand where the
meaningful use program works and where it doesn't. Additional policies and
incentives may be necessary.
5.5.3 Who should pay for HIE?
If health information exchange can be shown empirically to reduced costs
or improve quality, payers may have an interest in creating incentives that
encourage the medical groups with whom they contract to participate in HIEs.
[14] An analysis of the effect of each groups' participation on potential HIE value,
similar to what we do in the recruitment and retention simulations (S3 and S4),
could help inform the payment rates with empirical justification and provide a
better estimate of value compared with a flat fee per physician. [56] To avoid
free-riding among payers, all the major payers in a community may need to
coordinate to perform this kind of analysis, perhaps via a third party, so that
their HIE payment rates are fairly distributed among the payers. This kind of
differential fee schedule may be especially important for communities which
contain large medical groups that provide comprehensive care for many patients
(e.g. Kaiser Permanente) because they may employ many physicians but have
relatively little need for HIE because of their patients' visit patterns. Further
research might be needed to understand the nature of the value chain in HIE to
inform the specific payment rates.
As HIE technology improves, providers may be more willing to pay for
HIEs themselves, especially if they find HIEs save them time and helps them
deliver better care, which may improve their chances of receiving quality
payments. Providers may then have an interest in adopting a differential fee
schedule for HIE instead of payers. Estimates of potential value based on
patient visit patterns may be more effective as the basis of payment compared
with requiring providers to pay for each HIE access because that would involve a
disincentive for accessing the HIE.
5.5.4 Limitations
This study was limited to patients younger than 65 years who were
continuously enrolled with one private payer, and to providers with office
addresses within ten communities in Massachusetts. None of the communities
included a major urban center. The payer's market penetration may have varied
across the communities which may limit the comparability of the communities.
We did not verify the provider assignments to their medical groups, and we
assumed all providers stayed in the same groups for all three study periods. The
method we used to assign providers to groups may have overestimated medical
group fragmentation by separating those clinicians who share an EHR but reside
in different suites or addresses, or underestimated fragmentation by combining
those clinicians who reside in the same suite or address but use separate EHRs.
(Many clinicians may not even have EHRs yet.) We likely overestimated the
number of medical groups in each community because many providers had few
visits. Adjusting the results by reducing the number of medical groups would
strengthen our major conclusions. (See appendix 2.)
Potential value as estimated by care transitions may be very different from
actual value because providers may not use an HIE for every care transition.
However, we could not find enough data in the literature on actual usage to use
in our simulations. We did not stratify types of care transitions by value because
we could not find any studies that created such a stratification. However, some
types of data exchange are clearly more important than others. Our study is also
limited to the aggregate patient record form of HIE which involved a centralized
repository (called the hybrid model in chapter 2); we did not model other forms
of HIE, such as point-to-point data exchange between medical groups. [90]
The patterns we used for the simulation were contrived; we could not find
any evidence of the likelihood that certain types of medical groups would or
would not participate in HIEs or of their likelihood of merging. The patterns we
used considered variation in participation and merging separately; however,
many community HIEs may experience variation in both of these factors. We also
did not consider the affect of medical groups separating into smaller groups or
the establishment of new groups.
Finally, for all simulations, we used the total care transitions which
occurred in the community as the denominator for estimated potential value.
However, HIEs may also be interested in maximizing the percentage of care
transitions covered by the HIE for only participating providers or using other
metrics to evaluate their success.
5.6 Conclusions
In this early study of the care transitions and potential value of
community HIEs, we analyzed visit patterns of patients enrolled with one private
payer. Our findings suggest that, for many communities, mergers between
medical groups will not threaten HIE's value proposition unless many of them
occur. Therefore it would be prudent to continue to invest in HIEs. However, our
results also suggest that while most communities contain a few key medical
groups that would be critical participants in an HIE, they would likely not be
sufficient to realize most of the potential value in the community. Additional
incentives - carrots or sticks - maybe necessary to ensure that enough groups
participate in HIEs for them to realize their potential value.
This study demonstrates that an analysis of patient visit patterns can
provide important insights into the potential value of HIEs. Individual HIEs may
benefit from performing similar analyses as they grapple with issues related to
working with accountable care organizations, provider recruitment, and financial
sustainability.
5.7 Appendix 1 - Methodology details
Designating medical groups
We designated provider numbers in the data set who were listed at the same
address as part of the same group. For provider numbers listed at the same
address, in a large office building for example, we used the follow steps to
designate groups:
1. Put provider numbers which share the same suite number into the same
group. (Some providers do not have a suite number.)
2. Of the groups formed in step 1, merge together any groups that have
provider numbers with the same listed practice name. (Some providers do not
have a listed practice name.)
3. For the remaining provider numbers without listed suite numbers but who
do have listed practice names:
a. Merge the provider number into an already formed group that has
the same listed practice name.
b. Put the remaining provider numbers into groups who share the
same listed practice name.
4. For the remaining provider numbers without any listed suite or practice
name:
a. Merge the provider number with the already formed group that has
the most provider numbers of their same specialty. (Often there is only one
option.)
b. Merge the remaining provider numbers with the already formed
group that has the most provider numbers in the same specialty category, as
defined below.
c. Form new groups of the remaining provider numbers by grouping
specialties according to their same specialty categories.
d. For hospital addresses, assign radiologists, pathologists and
anesthesiologists to the hospital even if they had another group listed
Specialty categories:
1. Ophthalmology, Optometry
2. Clinical Nurse Specialist, LICSW, Psychiatry, Psychology (Note: Clinical
Nurse Specialist is also included in category 6)
3. Dentistry, Endontics, Periodontics, Oral surgery
4. Anesthesiology, Chiropractic, Neurology, Occupational Therapy,
Orthopedics, Physical Therapy Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, Podiatry
5. Audiology, Otolaryngologist
6. All other core specialties and Dietary Nutritionist
7. All other non-core specialties
Assigning visits to medical groups
All included claims that were listed as occurring in an office-based facility were
assigned to the group to which the provider number was assigned as per the
method above. Multiple claims ascribed to the same patient and provider number
for the same date were considered part of the same visit.
Claims that were listed as occurring in an inpatient facility as well as all
emergency claims (as indicated by CPT codes) were considered as part of the
same hospital visit if they contained overlapping visit dates. These hospital visits
were assigned to a community hospital in our analysis if one or more claim
involved with the visit was ascribed to a provider number associated with that
hospital. If an inpatient visit did not involved any claim associated with a
community hospital, the visit was excluded because the visit may have occurred
at a hospital outside of the community. If an inpatient visit involved claims
associated with more than one community hospital, the visit was excluded
because we were unable to determine at which hospital the visit occurred. To
locate the major hospitals in each community, we used Google.
Exclusions
We excluded: all claims assigned to facilities and other claims not labeled
"professional"; providers with addresses listed at P.O. boxes; and provider
addresses with fewer than 5 claims total in the three 18-month study periods.
We also excluded the following provider specialties:
Ambulatory Surgi-Center
Clinical Lab Participant
Coordinated Home Health Care
Detox facility
DME home med equipment/respiratory
Free-standing ambulance
Heading Aid Vendor
Home health care
Home Infusion
Independent Physiological and Diagnostics Lab
Individual Case Management
Pharmacy (participation)
Physiological Lab
Sleep testing facility
Surgical day care center
Community health center
Core specialties
We designated the provider numbers that were listed with the following
specialties as "core" and only used claims assigned to those numbers in the
portion of our analysis focused on core providers:
Allergy & Immunology
Anesthesiology
Anesthetist (certified registered nurse)
Cardiovascular Disease
Cardio-thoracic Surgery
Certified Nurse Midwife
Clinical Nurse Specialist
Colon & Rectal Surgery
Dermatology
Emergency Medicine
Endocrinology
Family Practice
Gastroenterology
General Practice
General Surgery
Geriatric
Gynecological Oncology
Hand Surgery
Hematology/Oncology
Hospital Based Anesthesiologists
Infectious Diseases
Internal Medicine
IVF
Maternal & Fetal Medicine
Nephrology
Neurology
Neurological Surgery
Neonatal/Perinatal Medicine
Nurse Practitioner
Obstetrics & Gynecology
Ophthalmology
Oral & Maxillofacial Surgery
Orthopedic Surgery
Otolaryngology
Pediatrics and all pediatric sub-specialties
Physician Assistant
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation
Plastic surgery
Pulmonary Disease
Psychiatry
Psychopharmacology
Reproductive Endocrinology
Rheumatology
Therapeutic Radiology
Urology
Vascular Surgery
Non-core specialties
We designated the provider numbers that were listed with the following
specialties as "non-core" and only used claims assigned to those numbers in the
portion of our analysis in which we included all providers (core and non-core):
Acute Care Hosp/Diagnostic Imaging
Anatomoc/Clinical Pathology
Audiologist
Chiropractic
Chronic disease hospital
Clinical Psychology
Diagnostic imaging
Diagnostic Radiology
Dietary Nutritionist
Early intervention
Endodontics
General Dentistry
Hematologic Pathology
Hospital Based Pathologists
Hospital Based Radiologists
Hospital (VA)
Hospice
Licensed Mental Health Counselor
LICSW
Multispecialty
Neuropathology
Occupational Therapists
Optometry
Orthodontics
Periodontics
Physical Therapy
Podiatry
Prosthodontics
Radiology
Speech Therapists
5.8 Appendix - additional results
The results of the simulations for all providers and summaries of the
results of all three study periods are summarized in the figures and tables below.
The results when including all specialties were similar to the results with only
core specialties. The results of the simulation varied minimally over the three
study periods.
For simulation 1, when including all specialties, even more mergers would
have to take place for the potential utility to decrease by more than 50%:
between 8 and 48 mergers were required.
For simulation 2, when including all specialties, community 2 appears to
be an outlier in that it required many more groups in order to retain the HIE's
utility in the event of substantial consolidation. This may represent an artifact of
the simulation heuristic we used: large number of practices with high visits
volumes but low transition percentages (e.g. children's mental health facilities)
would be the last to merge in this simulation, but they may involve many care
transitions may therefore not be very important to the HIE. Other possible
explanation is that community 2 contains many small practices of comparable
size and similar volumes of care transitions.
The key groups varied to some extent between core and all specialties.
When including all specialties, hospitals were involved in the most transitions in
every community, which probably is due to the effect of radiology and pathology.
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Figure 5.6 Larger mergers (simulation 1, for all specialties).
This pattern simulates the effect of mergers of medical groups on the potential value of community HIEs. Groups are chosen to merge based on the pairs of
groups with the most care transitions between them and so the first merger has the largest effect. The data include all specialties and patient visits from January
14 2005 through June 3 0 1h 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does not represent time. Every data
point simulates all patient visits for the entire the study period.)
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Figure 5.7 Small mergers (simulation 2, for all specialties).
This pattern simulates the effect of mergers of medical groups on the potential value of community HIEs. Groups with the smallest visit volumes are chosen to
merge with the group with whom they share the most care transitions and so the first mergers tend to have small effects. The data include all specialties and
patient visits from January 14 2005 through June 30h 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does not
represent time. Every data point simulates all patient visits for the entire the study period.)
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Figure 5.8 Recruitment (simulation 3, for all specialties).
This pattern simulates the effect of medical group participation in community IEs on the potential value of the HIlEs beginning with one group participating.
The sequence of groups is determined by decreasing volume of care transitions in each community. The data include all specialties and patient visits from
January 1" 2005 through June 3 0*' 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group mergers, and does not represent time.
Every data point simulates all patient visits for the entire the study period.)
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Figure 5.9 Retention (simulation 4, for all specialties).
This pattern simulates the effect of the absence of medical groups from community HIEs on the potential value of the HIEs beginning with full participation. The
sequence of groups is determined by decreasing volume of care transitions in each community and so the first group has the largest effect. The data include all
specialties and patient visits from January 14 2005 through June 3 0 th 2006. (Note: The x-axis represents a contrived pattern of variation in medical group mergers,
and does not represent time. Every data point simulates all patient visits for the entire the study period.)
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Community2 No. patients
57,343
22,974
60,336
23,324
66,273
68,252
49,963
21,774
22,048
10,550
No. visits3 Visits/patient No. transitions
459,754
157,231
305,283
199,470
364,460
381,083
240,409
128,878
133,367
83,900
8.02
6.84
5.06
8.55
5.50
5.58
4.81
5.92
6.05
7.95
241,604
59,822
122,242
105,850
141,493
151,966
85,963
50,301
52,864
41,900
median[min- 36,643.5[10,550- 219,939.5[83,900- 5.98[4.81- 95,906.5[41,900- 39.76%[35.76%- 0.0355[0.0224- 149[44-
max] 68,252] 459,754] 8.55] 241,604] 53.07%] 0.1047] 358]
Table 5.4 Community characteristics table (all specialties).1
1. Includes visits to core specialties from patients who were fully enrolled with one private payer from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2006.
2. Communities are presented here in the same order as in the main text, which was determined by increasing order of Herfindahl-Hirschman for core specialties
only.
3. Excludes each patient's initial visit in the study period because there is no way to determine if that visit involved a care transition.
4. Transition percentage is defined as the percent of total visits to community providers for which the patient's previous visit was to a different medical group in
the community.
105
Transition
percentage4
52.55%
38.05%
40.04%
53.07%
38.82%
39.88%
35.76%
39.03%
39.64%
49.94%
HHI
0.0224
0.0281
0.0324
0.0375
0.0335
0.0295
0.0458
0.0415
0.0555
0.1047
No.
groups
358
135
270
130
235
313
163
104
97
44
S2 S3
Communityl
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
No. groups2
358
135
270
130
235
313
163
104
97
44
No. big
mergers
which
would
reduce
potential
HIE usage
by >
25%3
16
14
10
10
8
12
8
8
7
2
No. big
mergers
which
would
reduce
potential
HIE usage
by >
50%3
48
36
29
25
29
33
21
15
16
8
No.
consolidated
groups
needed for
potential
HIE to be >
30%4
4
7
6
5
2
5
7
6
4
2
No.
consolidated
groups
needed for
potential
HIE to be >
50%4
8
20
10
9
6
10
13
10
7
3
No. groups
needed to
participate
to achieve
15%
potential
HIE
usage5,6
8
7
4
5
5
6
5
5
3
2
No. groups
needed to
participate
to achieve
50%
potential
HIE
usage5,6
37
31
23
19
25
27
18
14
15
7
Reduction in
potential HIE
usage from
absence of 2
groups5,6
21.01%
35.38%
31.45%
33.18%
34.22%
30.92%
42.84%
38.84%
43.90%
62.02%
Reduction in
potential HIE
usage from
absence of 5
groups5,6
32.83%
47.69%
47.88%
48.85%
52.46%
46.95%
56.38%
54.78%
60.56%
76.44%
median[min- 36,643.5[10,550- 34.80%[21.01%- 50.65%[32.83%-
max] 68,252] 9.[2-16] 27.[8-48] 5.[2-7] 9.5[3-20] 5.[2-8] 21.[7-37] 62.02%] 76.44%]
Table 5.5 Summary results (all specialties from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2006)
1. Communities are presented here in the same order as in the main text, which was determined by increasing order of Herfindahl-Hirschman for core specialties
only.
2. No. groups are those that constitute 99% of community care transitions.
3. The sequence of mergers was decreasing by number care transitions between the pairs of medical groups in each geographic community.
4. Consolidation was simulated by iteratively merging groups that had the smallest visit volumes into the groups with which they shared the most care transitions.
5. The sequence of the groups is decreasing by volume of care transitions in each geographic community.
6. The denominator for these percentages is the potential HIE usage for the study period in each community assuming complete participation and no mergers i.e.
the total number of care transitions between groups during the study period.
group
absences
which
would
reduce
potential
HIE
usage
by >
50%5,6
11
6
6
6
5
7
4
5
3
2
5.5[2-11]
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Community No. keygroups1
Percent of total groups
that are key groups2 Key group descriptions3
HIE value with
key groups only
(Simulation 3)
Decrease in potential
value of HIE if key
groups do not
participate
(Simulation 4)4
3.07%
4.44%
2.22%
4.62%
2.13%
2.24%
2.45%
4.81%
3.09%
4.55%
Hospital, Multispecialty, Hospital, Multispecialty,
Dermatology, Multispecialty, Radiology,
Pathology, Orthopedic Surgery, Primary care &
Pediatrics, Multispecialty
Hospital, Primary care, Primary care,
Multispecialty, Pediatrics, Primary care
Hospital, Multispecialty, Hospital, Multispecialty,
Pediatrics, Orthopedic surgery
Hospital, Primary care, Primary care,
Ophthalmology, Orthopedic Surgery, Obstetrics &
Gynecology
Hospital, Multispecialty, Hospital, Primary care,
Primary care
Hospital, Multispecialty, Multispecialty,
Multispecialty, Primary care, Orthopedic Surgery,
Primary care & Pediatrics
Hospital, Orthopedic Surgery, Multispecialty,
Primary Care
Hospital, Primary care & Pediatrics, Primary care,
Orthopedic Surgery, Primary care
Hospital, Multispecialty, Multispecialty
Hospital, Multispecialty
24.84%
14.47%
19.37%
22.57%
18.10%
19.10%
14.13%
16.84%
15.03%
23.98%
50.31%
50.48%
51.70%
52.92%
52.46%
52.63%
52.16%
54.78%
51.61%
62.02%
median[min- 5.5[2-11] 3.08%[2.13%-4.81%] N/A 186%1.3- 5.1[03%mein~i-1 .60%[14.13%- 52.31%[50.31%-
max] 24.84%] 62.02%]
Table 5.6 Key medical groups (all specialties, for visits from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2006).
1. Key groups are those involved in the most care transitions in the community and would limit HIE value to <50% of potential if they did not participate.
2. Total groups are those that constitute 99% of community care transitions.
3. The group descriptions are ordered from those involved in the most community care transitions to the least. 4. Assumes all non-key groups participate in HIE
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Community2
No.
patients[min-
mix]
1 [44,301-51,434]
2 [19,436-22,098]
3 [46,911-51,802]
4 [18,545-20,538]
5 [49,040-54,139]
6 [56,799-67,774]
7 [40,001-46,690]
8 [17,896-20,838]
9 [16,740-18,864]
10 [9,464-9,856]
Table 5.7 Range of community
No.
visits3
[min-
max]
[242,954-
295,460]
[88,470-
97,068]
[191,828-
207,770]
[110,495-
126,028]
[217,304-
236,462]
[225,887-
270,034]
[144,048-
166,589]
[70,856-
82,633]
[74,331-
80,687]
[50,679-
54,395]
Visits/patient
[min-max]
No.
transitions
[min-max]
[5.48-5.79] [113,328-138,114]
[4.25-4.551 [29,817-31,388]
[4.-4.09] [70,662-76,035]
[5.96-6.14] [55,372-63,139]
[4.37-4.431 [69,767-79,958]
[3.96-3.98] [81,857-96,909]
[3.33-3.61 [45,273-51,762]
[3.7-3.97] [30,783-35,536]
[4.11-4.52] [22,532-23,846]
[5.31-5.54] [22,767-23,596]
Transition
percentage
[min-max]4
[45.76%-
46.75%]
[31.98%-
33.7%]
[36.6%-
36.84%]
[49.44%-
50.11%]
[30.83%-
35.29%]
[35.89%-
36.24%]
[31.07%-
32.84%]
[43.%-
44.35%]
[29.55%-
30.46%]
[43.38%-
45.18%]
characteristics over three study periods (core specialties).1
HHI
[min-
max]
[.0221-
.0228]
[.0311-
.0329]
[.0372-
.039]
[.0361-
.0394]
[.038-
.0401]
[.0405-
.0484]
[.0387-
.0413]
[.0444-
.0455]
[.0661-
.0725]
[.1195-
.1421]
1. Includes visits to core specialties from patients who were fully enrolled with one private payer during three 18-month study periods from January 1st 2005
until June 30th 2009.
2. Communities are presented here in the same order as in the main text, which was determined by increasing order of Herfindahl-Hirschman for core specialties
only.
3. Excludes each patient's initial visit in the study period because there is no way to determine if that visit involved a care transition.
4. Transition percentage is defined as the percent of total visits to community providers for which the patient's previous visit was to a different medical group in
the community.
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Simulation 2 Simulation 3
No.
cumulative
mergers
which would
Community2 reduce
potential HIE
usage by >
25%[min-
max]7
[18-20]
[12-14]
[12-12]
[8-9]
[10-13]
[10-11]
[8-9]
[8-9]
[6-7]
[2-3]
No.
cumulative
mergers
which would
reduce
potential HIE
usage by >
50%[min-
max]7
[41-43]
[24-29]
[25-25]
[17-17]
[23-29]
[21-22]
[18-19]
[14-14]
[12-13]
[6-7]
No.
consolidated
groups
needed for
potential HIE
to be >
30%[min-
max]8
[3-4]
[3-4]
[4-5]
[2-4]
[4-6]
[3-4]
[6-6]
[4-5]
[3-3]
[2-2]
No.
consolidated
groups needed
for potential
HIE to be >
50%[min-
max]8
[4-7]
[6-9]
[7-7]
[4-6]
[7-7]
[4-5]
[7-8]
[7-8]
[4-6]
[3-4]
No. groups
needed to
participate
to achieve
15%
potential
HIE usage
[min-
max]5,6
[8-9]
[7-8]
[7-7]
[6-8]
[6-6]
[6-6]
[6-6]
[4-5]
[2-2]
No. groups
needed to
participate
to achieve
50%
potential
HIE
usage[min-
max]5,6
Reduction
in potential
HIE usage
from
absence of 2
groups[min-
max]5,6
[35-36] 17.66%]
[26.4%-[23-27] 28.01%]
[22.97%-[22-23] 23.37%]
[28.57%-[15-15] 29.43%]
[23.7%-[22-26] 25.91%]
[25.12%-[19-20] 26.66%]
[26.97%-[16-17] 28.35%]
[13-13] [27.78%-[13-13] 30.12%]
[12-131 [37. 12%-[12-13] 38.64%]
[59.56%-[6-7] 63.52%]
Table 5.8 Range of results (core specialties from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2009)
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Reduction in
potential HIE
usage from
absence of 5
groups[min-
max]5,6
[34.27%-
35.12%]
[43.93%-
46.51%]
[40.93%-
41.49%]
[51.15%-
52.59%]
[43.09%-
45.48%]
[46.53%-
49.71%]
[50.81%-
54.38%]
[49.83%-
51.7%]
[62.36%-
64.5%]
[80.92%-
82.35%]
No.
group
absences
which
would
reduce
potential
HIE
usage
by >
50%[min-
max]5,6
[10-11]
[7-7]
[8-8]
[5-5]
[6-7]
[6-6]
[5-5]
[5-6]
[3-3]
[2-2]
Simulation 4Simulation 1I
1. Communities are presented here in the same order as in the main text, which was determined by increasing order of Herfindahl-Hirschman for core specialties
only.
2. No. groups are those that constitute 99% of community care transitions.
3. The sequence of mergers was decreasing by number care transitions between the pairs of medical groups in each geographic community.
4. Consolidation was simulated by iteratively merging groups that had the smallest visit volumes into the groups with which they shared the most care transitions.
5. The sequence of the groups is decreasing by volume of care transitions in each geographic community.
6. The denominator for these percentages is the potential HIE usage for the study period in each community assuming complete participation and no mergers i.e.
the total number of care transitions between groups during the study period.
110
Community2
HHINo. visits3 Visits/patient .ten i iNo. patients[min-
mix]
[50,386-57,343]
[22,974-26,724]
[60,336-67,218]
[21,221-23,324]
[66,273-77,069]
[68,252-82,465]
[49,963-61,891]
[21,774-26,829]
[22,048-27,778]
[10,070-10,550]
[min-max]
[393,261-
459,754]
[157,231-
176,744]
[305,283-
341,347]
[195,399-
202,934]
[364,460-
399,199]
[381,083-
474,143]
[240,409-
287,491]
[128,878-
153,500]
[133,367-
158,103]
[83,900-
84,865]
[min-max] [min-max]4 max][min-max]
[7.8-8.1]
[6.61-6.84]
[5.06-5.15]
[8.55-9.21]
[5.1-5.5]
[5.58-5.8]
[4.62-4.82]
[5.72-5.92]
[5.69-6.05]
[7.95-8.33]
[51.98%-
52.81%]
[36.38%-
38.05%]
[39.09%-
40.04%]
[53.07%-
53.59%]
[36.04%-
38.82%]
[38.94%-
39.88%]
[34.66%-
35.76%]
[37.67%-
39.03%]
[38.01%-
39.64%]
[49.94%-
52.63%]
[.0193-
.0224]
[.0252-
.0281]
[.0311-
.0324]
[.0359-
.0375]
[.0285-
.0335]
[.0267-
.0295]
[.0458-
.0529]
[.0369-
.0428]
[.0482-
.0555]
[.0784-
.1047]
Table 5.9 Range of community characteristics over three study periods (all specialties).1
1. Includes visits from patients who were fully enrolled with one private payer during three 18-month study periods from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2009.
2. Communities are presented here in the same order as in the main text, which was determined by increasing order of Herfindahl-Hirschman for core specialties
only.
3. Excludes each patient's initial visit in the study period because there is no way to determine if that visit involved a care transition.
4. Transition percentage is defined as the percent of total visits to community providers for which the patient's previous visit was to a different medical group in
the community.
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[207,692-
241,604]
[59,822-
64,300]
[122,242-
134,231]
[104,121-
108,752]
[138,439-
152,268]
[151,966-
184,615]
[85,963-
100,974]
[50,301-
59,064]
[52,864-
61,104]
[41,900-
44,666]
Simulation 2 Simulation 3
No.
cumulative
mergers
which would
Community2 reduce
potential HIE
usage by >
25%[min-
max]7
[16-19]
[14-17]
[10-12]
[10-12]
[8-13]
[12-13]
[7-8]
[8-9]
[7-8]
[2-4]
No.
cumulative
mergers
which would
reduce
potential HIE
usage by >
50%[min-
max]7
[48-54]
[36-43]
[29-33]
[25-30]
[29-40]
[33-40]
[20-21]
[15-18]
[16-23]
[8-11]
No.
consolidated
groups
needed for
potential HIE
to be >
30%[min-
max]8
[3-5]
[7-8]
[6-6]
[5-6]
[2-3]
[2-5]
[7-7]
[6-8]
[4-4]
[2-2]
No.
consolidated
groups needed
for potential
HIE to be >
50%[min-
max]8
[8-9]
[18-20]
[10-11]
[9-11]
[5-6]
[7-10]
[11-13]
[10-12]
[7-9]
[3-4]
No. groups
needed to
participate
to achieve
15%
potential
HIE usage
[min-
max]5,6
[8-8]
[7-8]
[4-5]
[5-5]
[5-6]
[6-7]
[4-5]
[5-5]
[3-4]
[2-2]
Table 5.10 Range of results (all specialties from January 1st 2005 until June 30th 2009)
No. groups
needed to
participate
to achieve
50%
potential
HIE
usage[min-
max]5,6
Reduction
in potential
HIE usage
from
absence of 2
groups[min-
max]5,6
[37-41] [17.88%-21.01%]
[31-37] [32.12%-35.38%]
[23-27] 31.45%]
[19-23] [32.43%-33.18%]
[25-33] [29.76%-34.22%]
[27-32] [28.34%-30.92%]
[17-18] [42.84%-45.92%]
[14-16] [35.53%-38.84%]
[15-19] [40.68%-43.9%]
[7-10] [52.49%-62.02%]
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No.
group
absences
which
would
reduce
potential
HIE
usage
by >
50%[min-
max]5,6
[11-13]
[6-7]
[6-7]
[6-6]
[5-5]
[7-7]
[3-4]
[5-5]
[3-4]
[2-2]
Reduction in
potential HIE
usage from
absence of 5
groups[min-
max]5,6
[30.03%-
32.83%]
[44.89%-
47.69%]
[45.7%-
47.88%]
[46.77%-
48.85%]
[50.48%-
52.5%]
[44.22%-
46.95%]
[56.3 8%-
59.79%]
[50.88%-
54.78%]
[57.13%-
60.56%]
[68.86%-
76.44%]
Simulation 1 Simulation 4
1. Communities are presented here in the same order as in the main text, which was determined by increasing order of Herfindahl-Hirschman for core specialties
only.
2. No. groups are those that constitute 99% of community care transitions.
3. The sequence of mergers was decreasing by number care transitions between the pairs of medical groups in each geographic community.
4. Consolidation was simulated by iteratively merging groups that had the smallest visit volumes into the groups with which they shared the most care transitions.
5. The sequence of the groups is decreasing by volume of care transitions in each geographic community.
6. The denominator for these percentages is the potential HIE usage for the study period in each community assuming complete participation and no mergers i.e.
the total number of care transitions between groups during the study period.
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Chapter 6 HIE and other changes in the healthcare
system
6.1 Abstract*
Health information exchange is embedded in the larger healthcare system.
We identify a number of healthcare system changes that may overcome the
barriers to HIE adoption and usage, including changes in the incentives that
providers face. We also discuss how HIE may be an important component of
some of those changes, reflecting a possible chicken-egg dilemma. It is unknown
which changes will actually work to improve adoption and usage of HIE and we
recommend that all of them be tried and evaluated.
6.2 Introduction
The previous chapters of this thesis have deepened extant knowledge of
healthcare providers' adoption and usage of HIE, knowledge of both provider
organizations' values and of individual clinicians' experiences with HIE. Informed
by these investigations, we have offered several near-term policy
recommendations, directed mostly at the remaining stages of the meaningful use
payments and how to establish a robust HIE infrastructure. This chapter
considers these policy recommendations in a larger context by evaluating them
alongside other potential changes in the healthcare system, changes which may
also have a substantial impact on HIE adoption and usage. These changes
include: patient-centered medical home pilots, accountable care organizations,
improvements in quality measures, and increases in patient demand for HIE. We
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of these changes by assessing how they
may impact the many barriers of HIE adoption and usage that have been
identified in this thesis and in previous studies. Figure 6.1 summarizes the
chapter by mapping the healthcare system changes to the barriers of HIE
adoption and usage which the changes may affect.
* Much of the contents of this chapter was published in: "The Litmus Test for Health Information Exchange
Success: Will Small Practices Participate?" Invited Commentary, Arch Intern Med., 2010
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Figure 6.1: How other changes in
adoption and usage
the health care system may address barriers to HIE
6.3 Technology standards and certification of health IT products
Since 2004, the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT has
worked to establish and harmonize standards for technical interoperability and to
certify EHR and HIE products based on their adherence to these standards. It is
unlikely that technical standards will advance in the near future to the point
where EHRs and HIE are "plug and play" because of the complexity of health
information data models, use cases and workflows, and in particular challenges
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Health system Mean- Technology Patient- Quality Account- Patient
changes: ingful standards, based measures able care demand
use pay- certification medical for care organ- for HIE
ments of EHRs and home coord- izations
(for HIE products ination
Barriers to HIE usage
adoption and and
usage: training)
Medical groups
(HIE adoption):
Technology X X
issues (e.g.
installing and
maintaining)
Cost X
Lack of financial X X X X X
benefit
Concerns of X X
sharing data with
competitors
Privacy concerns X X
Individual
clinicians (HIE
usage):
Incompleteness X X X X X X
of HIE data
Technical X
usability issues
Integrating HIE X X X X X X
into clinical
workflow
related to semantic interoperability. However, these standards have the potential
to reduce the technical barriers to integrating EHRs with HIEs and reduce
providers' uncertainty when selecting health IT products. Ideally, technical
standards and certification would engender competition among EHR vendors
based on interoperability and leave behind business strategies aimed at locking
doctors and patients in to proprietary systems. However, if the standards are not
granular or do not include semantic standards, they may provide only minimal
benefit. Standards also run the risk of reducing innovation in data models and
increasing entry barriers for new EHR products; however, considering the
relatively low adoption of EHRs and HIE, standardization may be worth these
risks.
The ONC-sponsored Direct Project (formerly NHIN Direct) has recently
issued standards related to point-to-point communication among healthcare
providers. [50] This kind of data exchange may be especially useful when
patients receive care in different geographical communities, data exchanges
which would not be possible in regional data sharing services. As we point out in
chapter 3, however, if these standards and related policies are not integrated
with more advanced forms of HIE, such as aggregate patient records, they may
undermine the adoption of these advanced forms of HIE, because providers may
find the point-to-point communication sufficient for their needs, even when they
have access to aggregate patient records for local patient. If providers are not
willing to pay for advanced data exchange services, HIEs will stop investing in
them, even though the advanced services may support substantial improvements
in clinical care by offering, for example, the ability to search and query
longitudinal patient records and patient portals.
While technical standards may be necessary to foster HIE, they will
probably not be sufficient, because the costs of operating an HIE will still be
significant and providers' incentives to adopt and use HIE will remain largely
unchanged.
6.4 Meaningful use payments
The $27 billion of payments for meaningful use of health IT have the
potential to greatly increase EHR adoption and HIE participation in the near term.
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If targeted as we suggest in this thesis, these incentives may also increase
individual clinicians' usage of aggregate patient records, either by directly paying
clinicians for contributing to and accessing the HIE, or indirectly through
payments to HIE organizations or regional health IT extension centers to
motivate them to help clinicians integrate HIE services into their workflows.
One possible advantage of the meaningful use payments to clinicians is
they may pay for HIE usage directly. The payments may also create a more
competitive marketplace for HIE services and generate more investment in HIE
technology, which may result in improvements in usability and fewer technical
issues. However, the risk of paying directly for usage (or any measure of clinical
process instead of outcome) is gaming: clinicians may access an HIE only to
receive the incentive payments rather than for clinical purposes. Meaningful use
metrics will at best be approximations of the measures that are of interest to
policymakers, measures related to care quality and health outcomes. Whether
gaming is a serious concern is a question that must be addressed empirically.
Payments to regional health IT extension centers based on clinicians' HIE usage
may not suffer from potential problems of gaming but these centers may have
limited influence on changing clinician's workflows to integrate HIE.
Gaming aside, the meaningful use payments alone may not be large
enough to overcome the barriers to adoption of EHRs and HIE, especially for
small providers who lack the resources to devote to installing and managing new
software systems and training clinicians to use them.[111] [112] One study of
HIE participation in small primary care practices in Minnesota in 2008-9 found
that "no practice was fully involved in a regional HIE and HIE was not part of
most practices' short-term strategic plans."[112] Because small primary care
practices provide a large portion of care in many regions, they represent critical
stakeholders to HIEs. These stakeholders, however, may be the hardest group to
engage in HIEs because of their difficult financial situations and large patient
loads.[110] Small primary care practices therefore may represent the litmus test
for the success of HIE.
If a substantial number of providers have not met the meaningful use
requirements by 2016, when the penalties go into effect, providers may attempt
to have the penalties delayed or rescinded through lobbying. There is currently
no mechanism established to pay for HIE after the meaningful use payments run
out. While it is possible that accessing an HIE will become the standard of care
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eventually, if the incentives that providers face are the same in the future as
they are today, HIE adoption and usage will likely remain low.
6.5 Patient-centered medical homes
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 includes a provision to create patient-
centered medical homes. These pilots involve enhancing the responsibilities of
primary care physicians to include strong partnerships with the patient and their
care givers. If enacted on a large scale, patient-centered medical homes may
increase demand for HIE by making payments to primary care providers to
"support coordination of care" between providers and the "use of health
information technology for quality improvement." [89] A number of
demonstration pilots are under way.[113] However, it has not been shown
empirically that providers who participate in these pilots are more likely to
participate in and use HIEs. Also, the medical homes projects do not include any
extra payments to specialist physicians, many of whom may still not adopt HIE.
Further research is required to understand the impact of these projects on HIE
adoption and usage.
6.6 Quality measures for care coordination
As stated in Chapter 1, health IT and quality measurement may be stuck
in a chicken-egg dilemma: health IT is required to create better quality
measurements by allowing clinical data to be effectively aggregated, but the
development of better quality metrics requires health IT to be adopted first.
Once health IT becomes adopted to a sufficient degree - possibly because of the
meaningful use payments - quality measures may evolve so that providers will
be motivated to engage in HIE to improve their quality scores, especially those
scores related to coordination of care. Consistent with our findings in chapter 2,
one study found that quality reporting was a "frequently mentioned motivation
for establishing HIEs." [112] If HIEs are adequately designed to support quality
measurements, and those measurements are expanded to become more
comprehensive, quality-based performance payments may have the potential to
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pick up where the meaningful use payments leave off. One study assesses extant
metrics for their sensitivity to health IT usage and suggests several de novo
metrics that specifically require HIE. [39] However, there are many challenges to
using clinical data for quality measurement purposes including data accuracy,
data completeness, and data comparability. [114].
Another challenge to quality measurement is determining a suitable level
of analysis. Recent studies show that episode-based metrics for physician cost
profiling may not achieve sufficient reliability for many individual physicians and
quality ratings may need to be computed for medical groups instead. [115] [116]
This may best occur in the form of accountable care organizations, which we
discuss next.
6.7 Accountable care organizations
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 allows for the creation of accountable
care organizations (ACO). An ACO is a group of providers who accept
accountability for the cost and quality of a specific group of patients. [88] [117]
ACOs and HIEs will have an interest in working together. If ACOs believe that
HIE will reduce costs or improve quality, they will participate in HIEs and
encourage their clinicians to use the data exchange services. They may also use
the HIE to help with quality measurement. Conversely, HIEs will look to ACOs to
help them achieve sustainability.
It is unknown how HIEs and ACOs will co-evolve. In many instances, they
may become the same organization and HIEs will facilitate data sharing within an
ACO. In other cases, an ACO may utilize an HIE's services for internal or external
data sharing but retain separate ownership and management.
While there may be different variants of ACO, the ones that accept the
most accountability are likely to engage in data sharing activities as evidenced by
the experience of Kaiser Permanente. Because Kaiser is an integrated payer and
provider, it essentially is an ACO that accepts all responsibility for cost and
quality, and Kaiser is leading the way in health data sharing. [118] Therefore, it
is likely that ACOs, and their use of quality metrics, will ease provider concerns
regarding sharing data with competitors and, indeed, will actively foster HIE by
facilitating improvements in providers' quality scores.
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6.8 Patient demand for HIE
Market forces may play a role in fostering adoption and usage of HIE. A
RAND study advises the government to "make policy decisions that turn
[healthcare] IT into a competitive weapon." [15] Unfortunately, with today's
shortage of primary care providers, few will think to use HIE as a competitive
weapon to attract new patients, as many already have full panels. [15][119] It is
unknown the extent to which patients may choose a provider based on their HIE
adoption or if providers will respond to such demand from patients. One HIE
project has focused on outreach to educate health care consumers about the
benefits of clinical data exchange.[111] However, because patients are generally
not involved in provider-provider data exchange, it may be unlikely that many
patients would think to choose a physician based on their participation in an HIE
or even know which physicians were involved in HIEs.
Patient demand for HIE may grow when patients come to expect access
to their own health data in an organized electronic form: when HIEs offer patient
portals, allowing them to view and manipulate data from their providers and
clearly see which providers are participating and which are not. If HIEs advance
to the point where patients can access their own clinical data, market forces - in
the form of patients' expectations - may become strong enough to bring
providers toward HIEs.
Another form of HIE may happen if EHRs connect directly to personally-
controlled health records (PCHR), bypassing HIE organizations altogether. This
form of HIE would involve the patient controlling and managing their health data.
Indivo, Google Health, Microsoft Health Vault are examples of products
attempting to provide this kind of data exchange service. (Google Health recently
announced that it was shutting down.) This form of HIE, however, has the
disadvantage of requiring the patient to manage all of their own data exchanges.
Ideally, a patient could have both: manage their own data in a PCHR and allow
their clinicians to exchange data among themselves directly via an HIE if the
patient chooses to allow such exchanges. Having this capability may motivate the
patient to choose providers who use these kinds of products.
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6.9 Conclusion
As shown in figure 6.1, all of the barriers to HIE may be addressed by
changes in the healthcare system, many of which are currently being piloted.
Because none of these changes have been demonstrated empirically to have an
impact on providers' adoption and usage of HIE, the figure should be considered
as only a rough guide. We suggest that all the changes shown should be
attempted where feasible and their impact on HIE should be studied empirically.
Some changes will be more difficult to implement than others, and the success of
any change in incentives may rest on the effectiveness of technical standards in
fostering interoperability. We may have inadvertently missed some barriers to
HIE or potential health system changes that may affect HIE adoption and usage.
In the short-term, the meaningful use payments may motivate many
providers to adopt HIE, but some providers may still need even more direct
subsidies or be allowed to contribute clinical data to HIEs for free and only pay
for access to collected clinical data. In the long-term, HIE must be embedded in
the larger healthcare system's incentive structures. When the meaningful use
payments expire, if patient-based medical home projects, quality-based
performance payments, ACOs and patient demand for HIE have not gained in
influence, HIEs may still suffer from the difficulties of sustainability and attracting
small providers that they grapple with today, and much of the potential benefit
of HIE will not be realized.
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Chapter 7 Conclusions
This thesis has answered, to some extent, the four questions we began
with:
Question 1: What are the values of healthcare provider organizations as
stakeholders in HIE?
Answer: In three communities, healthcare provider organizations expected
regional HIE organizations to bring them benefits from the ability to measure
care quality. However, one relatively larger community placed greater value on
the strategic interests of its individual provider institutions, whereas two smaller
communities valued the interests of the communities as a whole.
Question 2: What factors affect clinicians' usage of health information
exchange?
Answer: Usage factors were categorized as motivators and moderators.
Motivators for individual clinicians' usage of HIE included improving care quality
and time savings. Moderators were numerous and included gaps in data,
workflow complexity and usability issues. Several policy options and implications
are discussed including: requiring HIE organizations to report metrics of HIE
contributions and accesses; certifying HIE vendor companies to provide
standardized usage metrics; and creating incentives for clinicians as well as HIE
organizations and regional health IT extension centers to meet HIE usage targets.
Question 3: What is the potential value of HIE as measured by "care
transitions?"
Answer: In one community, 51% of visits involved care transitions among
individual providers, and 36-41% involved care transitions between medical
groups. The percentage of a provider's visits which involved care transitions
varied considerably by clinical specialty and even within specialties. Within
primary care, individual clinicians' "transition percentages" varied from 32% to
95%.
Question 4: How do mergers and variation of provider participation affect
an HIE's potential value?
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Answer: Simulation patient visit patterns in 10 communities suggest that
even after substantial consolidation of medical groups, an HIE would still have
many opportunities for data exchange. However, in each community a small
number of medical groups were key: if absent from a community HIE, these
groups would reduce the value by 50%. Conversely, if they were the only groups
participating, the HIE's value would only achieve 10-20% of its value with all
groups participating.
This thesis has advanced the current understanding of health information
exchange in several ways. Through qualitative methods, it has more deeply
described the stakeholders' expectations and values regarding HIE, as reflected
in organizational decisions and individual clinicians' usage of the technology. The
simple framework of motivators and moderators may be useful to other
researchers who are trying to understand the users of other kinds of technical
functionality.
Through quantitative methods, it has shown how patient visit patterns,
provider participation and medical group mergers may influence the potential
value that HIE may provide. One of this thesis' largest contributions is showing
that care transitions can be used as a measure of HIE value in that they
represent opportunities for data exchange services to be used. This thesis has
also shown that claims data may be useful for understanding an HIE as a system
by extrapolating patient visit patterns from such data.
It is still unknown if HIE will succeed on a large scale in the U.S. or in any
other country. This thesis suggests that focusing on technical aspects, while
important, is not enough. Socio-technical aspects of healthcare delivery must be
considered, including public policy, incentives, and clinical workflows. To succeed,
there will likely need to be co-development of several of these components, and
this thesis offers a few suggestions which involve all of the major stakeholders in
HIE.
Further research is needed to understand the clinician-user and the
system in which the users and the technology interact. Specifically, an improved
knowledge of different kinds of care transitions would be essential to
understanding the value of HIE and would allow improvements to our simulation
model in Chapter 5. Such knowledge could also be used to inform the design of
new technical functionalities beyond simple data exchange. HIE will evolve to
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support richer forms of collaboration among clinicians and with patients. It will
be important to understand and develop usage measures for these new
functionalities so that they can be improved and so that researchers can
investigate which forms of usage are most effective.
HIEs will present enormous opportunities for secondary uses, and
development of those applications, especially applications related to quality
analysis, may be essential to achieve sustainability in HIE organizations and
improvements in healthcare delivery.
After decades of failed attempts, HIE may be on a path toward success,
now that policymakers are engaged and have invested considerable resources.
However, it may still take many years and experiments before HIE realizes even
a modest portion of its potential. It will be important to learn from the successes
and failures and to continue employing a systems perspective to understand HIE.
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